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This thesis consists of two essays on economic fluctuations.
The first essay (Chapter 2) explores the role of expectations in eco-
nomic fluctuations. It does so within a cashless, monetary, and competitive
economy featuring producers and consumers/workers with asymmetric infor-
mation. Only workers observe current productivity and hence they perfectly
anticipate prices, whereas all agents observe a noisy signal about long-run
productivity. Information asymmetries imply that monetary policy and con-
sumers’ expectations have real effects. Non-fundamental, purely expectational
shocks are conventionally thought of as demand shocks. While this remains
a possibility, expectational shocks can also have the characteristics of supply
shocks: if positive, they increase output and employment, and lower infla-
tion. Whether expectational shocks manifest themselves as demand or supply
shocks depends on the monetary policy pursued. Forward-looking policies
generate multiple equilibria in which the role of consumers’ expectations is ar-
bitrary. Optimal policies restore the complete information equilibrium. They
do so by manipulating prices so that producers correctly anticipate their rev-
enue despite their uncertainty about current productivity. I design targets
for forward-looking interest-rate rules which restore the complete information
equilibrium for any policy parameters. Inflation stabilization per se is typi-
cally suboptimal as it can at best eliminate uncertainty arising through prices.
This offers a motivation for the Dual Mandate of central banks.
The second essay (Chapter 3) shows that implementation cycles, intro-
duced in Shleifer (1986) , are possible in the presence of capital and the absence
of borrowing constraints. In a two-sector economy, patents on cost-saving ideas
which take the form of investment-specific technological change arrive exoge-
nously at a sequential, perfectly smooth rate: in odd-numbered periods, they
xi
reach a firm producing capital of type 1 and, in the even-numbered ones, a firm
producing capital of type 2 . Firms can make profits out of these once. While
the immediate appropriation (henceforth, “implementation”) of patents is al-
ways a possibility, for accordingly formed expectations, firms can alternatively
implement their patents simultaneously. This is because investment-specific
technological change naturally introduces a one-period discrepancy between
the time firms implement their patents and the time they receive revenue out
of them. The implementation of a patent implies a sharp fall in investment
which, in turn, causes a boom in current consumption. As a result, the con-
sumption boom takes place before the wealth boom. This not only eliminates
the need to smooth consumption away from the wealth boom to the period
before it as conjectured, but, further, it implies that the interest rate paid
when revenue is realized -and wealth expands- falls. Consequently, present
discounted profits rise and implementation cycles can become a possibility. In
a policy extension, I show that prolonging patent rights to two periods rules




Economic fluctuations are ubiquitous. This thesis consists of two essays ex-
ploring them from two entirely different perspectives.
The first essay (Chapter 2) , motivated by recent empirical studies1
illustrating the major contribution of shocks to expectations in business cycle
fluctuations, explores how the economy responds to non-fundamental shocks to
expectations. Understanding the role of “sentiments” in economic fluctuations
can lead to policies more successful in containing them.
The conventional wisdom is that purely expectational shocks exhibit
features associated with demand shocks (think, for instance, of shocks to gov-
ernment expenditure):2 when positive, that is when agents overstate the capac-
ity of the economy, they increase output, employment and inflation. Inflation
stabilization emerges then as a natural policy recommendation.3 Nevertheless,
the US economy was characterized by high cyclical employment and relatively
1See for example Beaudry and Portier (2006), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2008), Blan-
chard et al. (2009)), Beaudry and Lucke (2010) and Barsky and Sims (2011a,b) .
2See for example Blanchard (2009), Angeletos and La’O (2009), and especially Lorenzoni
(2009, 2011).
3See for example the baseline case in Lorenzoni (2009).
1
low inflation in the mid-80s and the second half of the 90s, which are recalled
as periods of exuberant optimism. More strikingly, data suggest that con-
sumer sentiment and inflation are negatively correlated. An interpretation of
expectational shocks as demands shocks does not seem to fit.
I reconsider the nature of expectational shocks within a monetary, cash-
less, and competitive economy where producers and consumers/workers have
asymmetric information about current fundamentals and inflation (prices). I
show that expectational shocks can indeed have implications for the business
cycle actually associated with supply shocks (think, for instance, of oil shocks):
when positive, they increase output and employment, and they lower infla-
tion, implications at odds with the Phillips curve. Nonetheless, the possibil-
ity that expectational shocks manifest themselves as demand shocks remains.
The underlying forces are producers’ expectations about current productivity
which push toward a supply-shock interpretation and consumers’ expectations
about long-run productivity which push toward a demand-shock interpreta-
tion; which one (supply or demand) prevails depends on the monetary policy
pursued.
The above result was for the monetary authority following a “contempo-
raneous” (Taylor-type) rule. My second result concerns forward-looking poli-
cies of the type the literature traditionally considers (for instance, see Clarida
et al. (2000)) . I show that forward-looking policies can generate a continuum
of equilibria for any choice of policy parameters. Interestingly, what distin-
guishes equilibria is the role of consumers’ expectations about the long-run
prospects of the economy which is arbitrarily specified. This is because the
equilibrium real interest rate is independent of them. A policy implication of
this result, which can contribute to the discussion about the desirability of
2
forward-looking policies, is that the short-run volatility of output due to ex-
pectational shocks can be substantially higher under forward-looking policies
than under “contemporaneous” ones.
A question that emerges naturally concerns the role of monetary pol-
icy and a monetary authority’s optimal response to shocks. Monetary policy
has real effects by virtue of asymmetric, as opposed to incomplete yet sym-
metric, information about inflation (prices) , an insight also offered in Weiss
(1980) and King (1982) . With flexible prices, producers’ incomplete informa-
tion is the only source of inefficiency. Optimal policies must restore then the
complete information equilibrium. I show that inflation stabilization per se
typically fails to do so -even in the case of “demand” shocks- as it at best
eliminates uncertainty arising through inflation. Optimal policies manipulate
inflation so that producers correctly anticipate their revenue despite their un-
certainty about current productivity. Bearing this in mind, I design targets
for forward-looking policies which restore the complete information equilib-
rium for any chosen policy parameters. These results offer a motivation for
the Dual Mandate of central banks.
The second essay (Chapter 3) shows that implementation cycles, intro-
duced in Shleifer (1986) , are possible in the presence of capital or any storable
commodity and the absence of borrowing constraints.
More analytically, the economy consists of a representative agent, a
competitive final-good firm and two capital-good sectors each comprising a
high number of capital-good firms. Capital makers use foregone consumption
(investment) to produce a capital good they specialize in used in the produc-
tion of the final good. In odd-numbered periods, a patent reaches randomly a
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firm in sector 1 and, in the even-numbered ones, a firm in sector 2 . Patents
are on cost-reducing technologies which imply that a unit of capital requires
less resources in order to be produced. Initially, as in Shleifer (1986) , I let
firms make profits out of a patent only for one period; once a patent is utilized,
the innovating firms’ competitors costlessly copy the idea the patent was on
and drive sector profits to zero -until a new patent arrives to the sector. As
competitors cannot reverse-engineer an idea a patent is on before it is actually
implemented, I use the terms patent and idea interchangeably.
Firms need to decide when they will implement their patents. I show
that, if they share expectations about future and have perfect foresight, multi-
ple “sunspot” equilibria can arise: firms can either implement their patents as
soon as they receive them, which implies that patents are in place at the same
-perfectly smooth- rate as that of their arrival, or they may instead coordinate
their implementation, in which case “implementation cycles” with capital are
generated.
To see this, note that imperfect competition invites demand external-
ities among capital-good sectors. Since a capital maker can postpone im-
plementation of a patent, for instance, to the following period, when with
certainty no improved technology will arrive, it needs to decide whether to
implement it immediately or in the following period. As Matsuyama (1995)
notes, it is precisely the intertemporal decision that firms face in combination
with the presence of intratemporal demand externalities that can result in
multiple Pareto-rankable equilibria.
Nevertheless, and despite this intuition, implementation cycles in the
presence of capital and the absence of borrowing constraints (or constrained
investment volatility) is something that Shleifer (1986) conjectured against:
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anticipating future profits, agents would attempt to reduce their current sav-
ings in order to smooth out consumption. In turn, that would lower production
and hence profits in a hypothetical implementation boom. For consumption
smoothing to be mitigated, higher real interest rates would be necessary, which
would in turn imply that firms discount future profits more. Both effects could
rule out implementation cycles.
Why is this not so here? The reason is that patents are on investment-
specific technological change, in the spirit of Greenwood et al. (1997, 2000) .
Investment-specific technological change introduces a one-period discrepancy
between the consumption boom and the wealth boom. To see this, note that
the implementation of a patent in the technology of a capital good reduces
its current production cost, whereas the revenue out of it becomes realized
in the following period. The latter implies that the wealth boom occurs one
period after the coordinated implementation of patents takes place. The for-
mer implies that investment is substantially reduced in the implementation
periods -in fact, it can even undershoot- and drives consumption above trend.
As a result, the interest rate paid then is higher than the interest rate paid
in the following, “wealth-boom,” period. This increases investment in imple-
mentation booms, smoothing out consumption in the opposite direction from
the conjectured one -without overturning the result on consumption which is
a general equilibrium one-, and implies that more capital is installed in the
following period which, given the elastic demand for it, leads to greater profits.
Taking all into account, discounted profits after a conjectured coordinated im-
plementation of patents become greater and, therefore, implementation cycles
with capital possible.
Turning to policy considerations, it is important to note that the ab-
5
stractions this essay makes allow it to concentrate solely on the effects of
patent rights on the implementation -rather than the generation- of patents
and, thereby, offer a clean argument from a different perspective to the ongoing
discussion about the length of patent rights.
In particular, I show that letting firms appropriate a patent for two
periods renders implementation cycles impossible and may lead to a welfare





The Role of Monetary Policy
2.1 Introduction
Recent empirical work suggests that shocks to expectations contribute signif-
icantly to economic fluctuations.1 But how so? This is a recurrent question
for academics, practitioners, and op-ed columnists. There is a growing con-
sensus that if, for instance, consumers overstate the economy’s fundamentals,
the economy booms at the cost of inflation. A recent literature has formalized
this idea:2 non-fundamental, purely expectational shocks behave like demand
shocks. When positive, they increase output and employment, and are infla-
tionary. Stabilizing inflation emerges then as a natural policy recommenda-
1 Empirical studies on the contribution of changes in expectations to business cycle fluc-
tuations include Beaudry and Portier (2006), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2008), Blanchard
et al. (2009)), Beaudry and Lucke (2010) and Barsky and Sims (2011a,b).




Nevertheless, Figures 2.1 - 2.4 show that the US economy was charac-
terized by high cyclical employment and relatively low inflation in the mid-80s
and the second half of the 90s, which are recalled as periods of exuberant
optimism. Notably, Figures 2.3 and 2.4 reveal that consumer sentiment and
inflation are negatively correlated.4 An interpretation of expectational shocks
as demands shocks does not seem to fit.
This essay reconsiders the nature of purely expectational shocks within a
competitive, monetary, cashless economy where producers and consumers/workers
have asymmetric information about fundamentals and inflation (prices). I
show that expectational shocks can have implications for the business cycle
associated with supply shocks: when positive, they increase output and em-
ployment, and they lower inflation, which is incompatible with the Phillips
curve.5 Nonetheless, the possibility that expectational shocks manifest them-
selves as demand shocks remains. The underlying forces are producers’ ex-
pectations which push toward a supply-shock interpretation and consumers’
expectations which push toward a demand-shock interpretation; which one
(demand or supply) prevails depends on the monetary policy pursued.
A natural question that emerges concerns the role of the monetary au-
thority and its optimal response to shocks. With flexible prices, producers’
incomplete information is the only source of inefficiency. Asymmetric, as
opposed to incomplete but symmetric, information about inflation (prices)
3See the baseline case in Lorenzoni (2009).
4 At a quarterly basis (Figure 2.3), the correlation of consumer sentiment and inflation
is −0.53 . Data are described in Appendix 2.9.
5 Gali (1992) considers the textbook IS-LM model coupled with a Phillips curve and
explores the effects of demand and supply shocks on the US business cycle. A discussion of
the Phillips curve can be found in Mankiw (2001).
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implies that monetary policy has real effects. Optimal policies restore the
complete information equilibrium. Inflation stabilization per se is typically
suboptimal as it at best eliminates uncertainty arising through inflation with-
out removing producers’ incomplete information. Optimal policies manipu-
late inflation so that producers correctly anticipate their revenue despite their
uncertainty about productivity. Bearing this in mind, I design targets for
forward-looking policies which restore the complete information equilibrium
for any chosen policy parameters.
A competitive (neoclassical) economy features two representative agents,
a consumer/worker and a producer, and a monetary authority. The worker
supplies labor to a firm, managed by the producer, which produces a single
commodity. Productivity consists of a permanent and a temporary compo-
nent. There is asymmetric information about its current realization: it is
specific and known to the worker, while the producer faces uncertainty about
it. The monetary authority sets the riskless short-term nominal interest rate.
I consider two interest-rate rules: a “contemporaneous” one and a forward-
looking one.
Each period is split into two stages: In the first stage, the worker realizes
his current productivity -not its individual components- , both agents observe a
noisy public signal about the permanent (equivalently, long-run) productivity
component, and the labor market opens (and closes). In the second stage, with
production pre-determined from stage 1 , the commodity and the nominal bond
markets open (and close) and all payments materialize. Prices are flexible in
all markets and agents are price-takers.
The nominal wage, announced in stage 1, reflects the producer’s ex-
pectations about productivity as well as stage 2 inflation (or prices). With
9
constant returns to scale, the scale of production is pinned down by labor
supply. The worker has complete information, so his labor decision and, con-
sequently, production depend on the nominal wage and the inflation he knows
will prevail in stage 2.
Inflation, in turn, depends on current productivity, on the producer’s
expectations about it, and the consumer’s expectations about long-run produc-
tivity in a way decided by monetary policy. Asymmetric information about
current productivity leads agents to form heterogeneous expectations about
the inflation to prevail; this opens the door to monetary policy. Further, to
the extent that inflation depends on the consumer’s expectations about long-
run productivity, the producer needs to second-guess the consumer. Then
the consumer’s expectations also have real effects, indirectly, through infla-
tion. Therefore, that inflation is realized after the labor market has cleared
not only prevents productivity from being revealed, but, in combination with
asymmetric information, it implies that monetary policy and the consumer’s
expectations have real effects.
Purely expectational shocks affect both agents’ expectations. The con-
sumer’s expectations about long-run productivity push toward a demand-
shock interpretation. A consumption smoothing motive underlies this. Con-
sider, for instance, positive purely expectational shocks. A consumer overly
optimistic about the long-run prospects of the economy raises his current de-
mand. If the producer had complete information about current productivity,
flexible prices would increase and wages would proportionally adjust leaving
the real wage intact. However, under incomplete information, the producer
overestimates the inflationary pressure caused due to the consumer’s expecta-
tions. As a result, the nominal wage increases more than proportionally and a
10
higher real wage prevails. This induces the worker to increase his labor supply
and production to expand.
The producer’s expectations about current productivity per se point
toward a supply-shock interpretation. A higher real wage reflects the pro-
ducer’s overly optimistic expectations; employment increases, production ex-
pands and, for a certain demand level, prices need to fall for the commodity
market to clear.
It should not perhaps come as a surprise that the producer’s incomplete
information manifests itself as a distortion in the labor wedge originating from
the labor demand side. The labor wedge is defined as the ratio of the marginal
product of labor to the marginal rate of substitution of leisure for consump-
tion.6 Chari et al. (2007) find that it is countercyclical and accounts for more
than half of the US output variance. When the real wage exceeds the marginal
product of labor, the labor wedge falls. Positive expectational shocks, then,
induce a countercyclical labor wedge.7
Whether expectational shocks cause an inflationary or a deflationary
pressure depends on the monetary policy pursued. Taking into account that
employment and output both increase (positive co-movement), it follows that
it is up to the monetary authority whether a demand- or a supply-shock in-
terpretation best fits expectational shocks.
In particular, the policy weight on the current output gap is central to
which interpretation prevails. To see this, fix the real interest rate and note
that, for a “contemporaneous” rule, expected inflation is zero, which implies
6See for example Hall (1997), Chari et al. (2007) and Shimer (2009).
7 Related papers generating a countercyclical labor wedge in response to expectational
shocks include Angeletos and La’O (2009), La’O (2010) and Venkateswaran (2011). Unlike
these papers, the present essay emphasizes the connection of monetary policy with the labor
wedge.
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that the real interest rate coincides with the nominal one. The nominal interest
rate targets inflation and the output gap. A positive expectational shock
results in a positive output gap. A higher weight on the output gap implies
less inflationary pressure which, in fact, may turn to a deflationary one.
Turning to productivity shocks, agents’ expectations underreact in re-
sponse to positive productivity shocks. As a result, a lower real wage pre-
vails which induces employment to fall,8 whereas output increases, however by
less than under complete information. Following the same line of thought as
above, the policy weight on current output gap determines whether produc-
tivity shocks are inflationary or disinflationary. Of course, agents learn over
time and their expectations eventually converge to the underlying productivity
level.
Considering forward-looking policies, the main difference with “contem-
poraneous” ones is that forward-looking policies generate a continuum of equi-
libria for any choice of policy parameters.9 Importantly, what distinguishes
equilibria is the role of the consumer’s expectations which is arbitrarily spec-
ified. Furthermore, the short-run volatility of output due to expectational
shocks is considerably higher under forward-looking policies than under “con-
temporaneous” ones. These results can contribute to the discussion about the
desirability of forward-looking policies.10
8 In the business cycle literature, Gali (1999) and Basu et al. (2006) also argue that
positive technology shocks cause a temporary fall in employment.
9As my focus is on the effects of purely expectational shocks as well as those of pro-
ductivity shocks, I do not discuss determinacy in the sense, for example, of Clarida et al.
(2000) or Bullard and Mitra (2002) (although that discussion has been recently revived with
Cochrane (2011)) . Nevertheless, it is important to mention that there is no real indetermi-
nacy here, since possible “sunspot” shocks lie outside the information sets of both agents
thereby having no real effects, a point on which I elaborate below. I resume this discussion
in fn. 60 .
10 Clarida et al. (1999, 2000) and Giannoni and Woodford (2003) also consider forward-
looking policies, however in different settings. The Bank of England is suggested to follow
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The nominal implications for forward-looking rules also differ, even after
controlling for the consumer’s expectations. This is because “contemporane-
ous” interest-rate rules pin down inflation, whereas forward-looking ones pin
down price levels. To see this, consider a positive purely expectational shock
and let prices depend positively on the producer’s expectations, which is true
for “active” policies, i.e. policies in which the monetary authority responds to
inflation more than one-to-one. Price levels exhibit a non-monotonic pattern in
response to expectational shocks: they increase on impact, however as agents
update their beliefs over time, they gradually return to their long-run level.
Thus, positive expectational shocks cause an inflationary pressure on impact
and a deflationary one from the following period onwards. By the same logic,
positive permanent productivity shocks are inflationary, until prices reach their
higher steady-state level.
The producer’s incomplete information is the only source of inefficiency.
Optimal monetary policies restore then the complete information equilibrium.
To do so they manipulate inflation (prices) so that the producer correctly
anticipates his stage-2 revenue, even though still uncertain about current pro-
ductivity. Inflation stabilization per se is typically suboptimal as it at best
eliminates the indirect, inflation, channel of expectations without removing the
producer’s uncertainty about current fundamentals. I design forward-looking
interest-rate rules which restore the complete information equilibrium. The
rules “punish” deviations of expected inflation and expected growth from tar-
gets which adjust to their complete information levels.
In an extension, I consider a forward-looking monetary authority with
superior information and let it communicate its information with noise. The
a forward-looking policy (Nelson (2000) provides an account of the period 1992 - 1997) .
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noise could be thought of as a measurement error or a monetary policy shock.
The nominal interest rate serves then as an endogenous public signal. To the
extent that prices depend positively on productivity, I show that positive mea-
surement errors and monetary policy shocks raise the producer’s expectations
about the following period’s productivity which results in higher prices and
output.
Related literature. The idea that changes in expectations affect the busi-
ness cycle has its origins at least in Pigou (1926) and has recently been revived
by Beaudry and Portier (2004).11 Christiano et al. (2010) show that expecta-
tional shocks are disinflationary in a New-Keynesian framework.12 However,
this strand of literature distinguishes between shocks to current and future
productivity, whereas I emphasize the distinction between fundamental and
non-fundamental shocks to expectations.
This essay lies in the literature following Phelps (1970) and Lucas (1972)
which has formalized the idea that incomplete information can open the door
to non-neutralities of non-fundamental factors.13 The closest paper is Loren-
zoni (2009). Lorenzoni (2009) restricts attention to the consumer side within
a New-Keynesian framework and suggests that purely expectational shocks
cause effects associated with demand shocks. Instead, I consider both the pro-
ducer and the consumer side in a competitive economy with flexible prices14
11See also Beaudry and Portier (2006, 2007) and Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009).
12It has also been suggested in the empirical work of Barsky and Sims (2011b).
13 Polemarchakis and Weiss (1977), Weiss (1980), King (1982), Bulow and Polemarchakis
(1983) and, especially, Grossman and Weiss (1982) are related papers of the early literature.
The literature has been revived with Woodford (2001), Morris and Shin (2002), Mankiw and
Reis (2002) and Sims (2003). Hellwig (2008), Mankiw and Reis (2010), Lorenzoni (2011)
and Chapter 9 in Veldkamp (2011) offer excellent surveys of the literature.
14 A strand of literature, which for instance includes Angeletos and La’O (2009), Angeletos
and La’O (2011a) and La’O (2010), also considers both sides however within non-monetary
“Lucas-islands” frameworks featuring Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition. This strand
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and suggest that purely expectational shocks can behave like supply or de-
mand shocks depending on the monetary policy pursued. To the best of my
knowledge, this essay is the first to suggest so.
This essay shares with Weiss (1980), King (1982) and Lorenzoni (2010)
the idea that monetary policy is non-neutral when there is asymmetric infor-
mation about variables the monetary authority will respond to.15 Crucially, it
is asymmetric, rather than incomplete but symmetric, information that breaks
the policy irrelevance, proposed in Sargent and Wallace (1975, 1976). Further-
more, the proposed optimal policies here differ from the one in Weiss (1980).
In Weiss (1980), prices perfectly reveal the unknown fundamentals, while here
prices are observed with a delay, so, by construction, this possibility is non-
existent.
The structure of the essay is as follows. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 present the
model. Section 2.4 considers a “contemporaneous” interest-rate rule and shows
that purely expectational shocks can have the features of demand or supply
shocks for different policy specifications. Section 2.5 presents and analyzes
the equilibria when a forward-looking interest-rate rule is followed and, in an
extension, endows the monetary authority with superior information. Section
2.6 discusses the role of monetary policy and proposes optimal policies. Section
2.7 concludes.
of literature emphasizes the link between dispersed information and strategic complemen-
tarities across islands which I abstract from.
15 Recent papers studying monetary policy in environments with informational frictions
include Adam (2007), Paciello and Wiederholt (2011) and Angeletos and La’O (2011b).
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2.2 Environment
The competitive economy features two agents: a representative consumer/worker
supplying labor to a representative firm he owns and a producer managing the
firm. The firm produces a non-storable commodity. The economy is cashless
and the only relevant financial market is a nominal bond market; a monetary
authority sets the price of a riskless short-term nominal bond according to a
“Taylor-type” rule.16 Agents are price-takers in all markets. Time is discrete
and infinite commencing in period 0. Each period comprises two stages: in
stage 1 only the labor market opens, whereas in stage 2 the commodity and
the nominal bond markets open.




βt U(Ct, Nt) , (2.1)
with period-t utility
U(Ct, Nt) = logCt − 1
1 + ζ
N1+ζt . (2.2)
Ct and Nt denote consumption and employment in period t, respectively, and
ζ > 0 denotes the inverse of the constant marginal utility of wealth (“Frisch”)
elasticity of labor supply. The consumer’s time preference is parametrized by
β ∈ (0, 1) .
The consumer faces a sequence of budget constraints given by
PtCt + QtBt+1 = Bt + WtNt + Πt , (2.3)
16Chapter in Woodford (2003) provides a treatment of cashless monetary economies.
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where Qt and Bt+1 denote the price and holdings of nominal bonds maturing
in t + 1 , respectively, Pt and Wt the commodity price and the nominal wage
in t, respectively, and Πt the firm’s profits that accrue to the consumer.
The firm’s technology is
Yt = AtNt , (2.4)
where At denotes the worker’s productivity.
Productivity consists of a permanent and a temporary component (hence-
forth lowercase letters will denote natural logarithms),
at = xt + ut , (2.5)
where x and u denote the permanent and temporary productivity components,
respectively. Productivity -not its components- is specific and known to the
worker, whereas the producer faces uncertainty about it.17
The permanent component xt follows a random walk stochastic process
xt = xt−1 + t , (2.6)
where t is an i.i.d shock and  ∼ N(0, σ2 ) . The temporary component ut is
i.i.d. and u ∼ N(0, σ2u) .
All agents have costless access to a public signal about the permanent
17 It may be argued that it is in the worker’s best interest to reveal his type as he is the
firm’s owner. This is only an abstraction. Although I have not explored this possibility, an
economy with many islands and complete financial markets which preserves the asymmetry




st = xt + et , (2.7)
where et is i.i.d. and e ∼ N(0, σ2e) . Shocks u ,  , and e are mutually indepen-
dent. Hereafter, I will call e a purely expectational shock.
The distinction between permanent and temporary productivity intro-
duces persistence in the shock effects.
2.2.1 Timing
Each period is divided into two stages. In the first stage, the consumer/worker
realizes his period productivity at , both agents and the monetary authority
realize the public signal about the permanent productivity component st , and
the labor market opens (and closes). In the second stage, the commodity
market and the nominal bond market open. All payments materialize in stage
2 and are perfectly enforceable.
Stage 1 is in turn divided into two sub-stages: in sub-stage 1 , new
information is realized and the nominal wage is announced, whereas, in sub-
stage 2 , the worker decides on his labor supply. This can be so by virtue
of the firm’s technology given by (2.4) : constant returns to scale imply that
the nominal wage is independent of the amount of labor to be submitted in
sub-stage 2 of stage 1 .18
In stage 2 , the monetary authority -whose role I specify below- steps
in to set the nominal interest rate according to an interest-rate rule and the
18I have introduced a lag in the labor supply decision to prevent it from fully revealing the
worker’s productivity. An alternative would be to let labor supply be subject to a preference
shock. Under such a specification, labor supply would (generically) be partially revealing
about the worker’s productivity. In the limit case in which the preference shock’s variance
tended to infinity, the producer would dismiss the informational content of labor supply and
his information set would coincide with the one here.
18
commodity market opens. The consumer decides on his bond holdings and
consumption at the prevailing prices. With nominal bonds in zero net supply,
the nominal bond price adjusts to clear the nominal bond market. With
production pre-determined from stage 1 , the commodity price adjusts to clear
the commodity market.
Since output (alternatively, the commodity price) perfectly reveals pro-
ductivity, in stage 2 both agents and the monetary authority have identical
information.
2.3 Rational Expectations Equilibrium
The state of the economy as of period t coincides with the entire history Ψt =
{(aτ )tτ=0 , (sτ )tτ=0} . This is so due to the agents’ formation of expectations on
which I elaborate below. Turning to the agents and the monetary authority’s
information sets, it follows from the above that Ipt,1 = {(aτ )t−1τ=0 , (sτ )tτ=0} =
Ψt \ {at} and Imt,2 = Ipt,2 = Ict = Ψt .
Definition 1 (Equilibrium). A rational expectations equilibrium under an
interest-rate rule Qt (Ψt) consists of prices {Pt (Ψt) , Wt (Ψt\{at})} , an alloca-
tion {Ndt (Ψt\{at}) , Yt (Ψt)} for the producer and an allocation {Ct (Ψt) , N st (Ψt) , Bt+1 (Ψt)}
for the consumer such that:
1. {Ndt (Ψt \ {at}) , Yt (Ψt)} solves the producer’s problem, laid out below,
at prices {Pt (Ψt) , Wt (Ψt \ {at}) , Qt (Ψt)} .
2. {Ct (Ψt) , N st (Ψt) , Bt+1 (Ψt)} solves the consumer’s problem, laid out
below, at prices {Pt (Ψt) , Wt (Ψt \ {at}) , Qt (Ψt)} .




t , Bt+1 = 0 for all t with B0 = 0 .
19
The producer’s labor demand in stage 1 maximizes the firm’s expected
evaluated profits, Ept [λt Πt | Ipt,1] . Expectations are conditional on the pro-
ducer’s information set in stage 1, Ipt,1 .
19 Using (2.4) , profits are given by
Πt = (PtAt − Wt)Nt and are evaluated using the consumer/owner’s La-
grange multiplier, λt .
20 Constant returns to scale imply that the producer





The consumer has complete information about the state of the economy.
Effectively, he makes all decisions in stage 1. Given B0 = 0 , the consumer
chooses consumption, labor supply, and nominal bond holdings to maximize his
expected utility (2.1) - (2.2) subject to his sequence of budget constraints (3.3)
and a no-Ponzi-scheme constraint (for instance, requiring that Bt+1 > −Γ
19Henceforth, the producer’s expectations will always refer to his expectations as of stage
1 (sub-stage 1) unless otherwise stated.
20One may correctly point out that the consumer’s Lagrange multiplier would perfectly
reveals (his) productivity. Implicitly I have assumed that, at the beginning of the each
period, the consumer and the producer physically separate. This assumption allows me to
abstract from the “Lucas-Phelps” islands framework and to consider only one “island” in
its stead. Given this, by maximizing the firm’s evaluated profits, the producer operates the
firm in the way the consumer/owner would want him to (see also Chapter 6 in Magill and
Quinzii (1996)) .
21 It is central to this essay that the nominal wage in stage 1 be such that the producer’s
expected evaluated profits are zero. Given the linear technology (2.4) , the producer is
willing to hire any labor supplied at that nominal wage given by (2.8) . This will typically
result in a production level not ex-post desirable: once the state of the economy is realized,
the real wage will typically be higher or lower than productivity, yielding losses or profits,
respectively, with profits (losses) added (subtracted) in a lump-sum fashion to (from) the
consumer/owner’s income. Even though the nominal wage is flexible and competitive, the
current setting could very roughly be thought to imply a form of nominal wage stickiness.
22On another note, since production takes place after the nominal wage is announced and
depends on the consumer/worker’s productivity, Yt in the definition of equilibrium above is
a function of the state Ψt rather than the producer’s information set in stage 1 , Ψt \ {at} .
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where Ect [·] refers to the consumer’s expectations conditional on his informa-
tion set Ict .
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In addition, the no-Ponzi-scheme condition and the fact that nominal
bonds are in zero net supply imply Bt+1 = 0 for all t in equilibrium. Sup-
pressing then bond holdings from the state of the economy is harmless.
In what follows, I restrict attention to linear equilibria.24 This simplifies
considerably the agents’ information extraction problems and allows me to use
the Kalman filter algorithm in order to study the evolution of agents’ beliefs.
For simplicity, I will work with log-linear approximations of (2.8) -
(2.10) . This is with no loss of generality: Appendix 2.10 shows that second-
order terms are constants. Log-linear approximations will be around the
stochastic steady state: since permanent productivity follows a random walk,
output and consumption (as well as price levels) are non-stationary and the
steady state stochastic.25 To restore stationarity one needs to normalize the
non-stationary variables with the permanent productivity component (see also
King et al. (1988)) . For instance, in the case of consumption, one could in-
stead write Cst =
Ct
ext
(in logs, cst = ct − xt) .26 I find it more convenient
23I have made no distinction between stages 1 and 2 for the consumer’s expectations
because the consumer’s information set does not change within a period.
24I ignore whether non-linear equilibria exist.
25See also fn. 41 .
26As in Lorenzoni (2005) , when it comes to the expectation of a normalized variable, one
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though to work with the non-normalized variables throughout.
2.3.1 Linear equilibria




t [at] + E
p
t [pt] (2.11)
ζnt = wt − pt − ct (2.12)
ct = − log β + logQt + Ect [ct+1 + pit+1] . (2.13)
Combining (2.11) and (2.12) results in
ζnt = E
p
t [at] + E
p
t [pt] − pt − ct . (2.14)
I use the optimality conditions (2.13) and (2.14) in the rest of the analysis.
The existence of a monetary policy rule can get round the equilibrium
indeteterminacy, nominal or real depending on whether agents have complete
information or not, that would have prevailed in its absence. However, as
Section 2.5 illustrates, the presence of a monetary authority per se need not
needs to additionally consider the expectation of permanent productivity. For instance, in
the case of consumption, Et [c
s
t ] = ct − Et [xt] .
27Where applicable, approximations are first-order around the stochastic steady state.
For the log-linear approximations see Appendix 2.8.1 , whereas for the characterization of
the steady state see Section 2.4.4 . A version without log-linear approximations of the
equilibrium under rule 1 (see below for this) can be found in Appendix 2.10 . It should be
straightforward to do the same with equilibrium under rule 2 .
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be enough.
Monetary authority. The monetary authority sets the gross nominal inter-
est rate (equivalently, the inverse of the logarithm of the nominal bond price) ,
it = − logQt , according to an interest-rate rule. Two commonly used rules
will be considered in sequence, a contemporaneously-looking one (henceforth,
rule 1) and a forward-looking one (henceforth, rule 2) :28
it = − log β + φpi pit + φy (yt − at) (Rule 1)
it = − log β + φpi Emt [pit+1] , (Rule 2)
where it denotes the nominal interest rate and pit denotes inflation in period
t, defined as pit := pt − pt−1 . In the case of rule 1, the monetary authority
targets the output gap defined as the deviation of output from its complete
information counterpart at . I restrict attention to non-negative values of the
policy weights, φpi and φy .
The monetary authority’s information is solely based on the sequence
of public signals as well as information extraction from prices and quantities.
In Section 2.5.5, I let it be endowed with superior information when it fol-
lows rule 2 and subsequently study the information extraction problem of the
agents. I consider more rules in Section 2.6 which explicitly studies the optimal
monetary policies in the current framework.
28 Rule 1 has been suggested by Taylor (1993, 1999) to capture adequately the Fed’s
policy during the period 1987 - 1992 . Among other papers, rule 2 is considered in Clarida
et al. (1999, 2000) . Nelson (2000) proposes that a forward-looking rule fits well the Bank
of England’s policy in the period 1992 - 1997.
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2.3.2 Expectations and the state of the economy
The state of the economy as of period t coincides with the the entire history
Ψt = {(aτ )tτ=0 , (sτ )tτ=0} . Past realizations of productivity and the public
signal are part of the current state due to the agents’ formation of expectations.
In particular, I assume that the evolution of the agents’ expectations about
permanent productivity is given by the Kalman filter algorithm.29 This is
because inflation (prices) and/or quantities perfectly reveal productivity in
stage 2 of each period. For this reason, the monetary authority’s information





t = Ψt . The producer’s expectation about current productivity as of
stage 1 coincides with his expectation about its permanent component which
follows from (2.5) and the fact that his information set in stage 1 , which I
show in the next section, is Ipt,1 = {(aτ )t−1τ=0 , (sτ )tτ=0} . More analytically and
bearing (2.5) in mind, agents and the monetary authority’s expectations evolve
as
Ept [at] = E
p
t,1 [xt] = (1− µ)Ept−1,2 [xt−1] + µ st (2.15)
Ept,2 [xt] = E
c
t [xt] = E
m
t [xt] = (1− k)Ect−1 [xt−1] + k [θ st + (1− θ) at] ,
(2.16)




u and are in (0, 1) . Appendix
2.8.2 offers an explicit treatment of the formation of expectations.
29Throughout this essay, I assume that agents learn/form expectations in a Bayesian
way. I have not explored alternative learning/expectation-formation specifications, a subject
beyond the scope of this essay. Further, agents could possibly update in other Bayesian ways
which I ignore.
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2.4 Equilibrium under Rule 1: Demand or Sup-
ply?
2.4.1 Complete information benchmark
Consider the case in which the state of the economy is common knowledge.
Then, the real side of the economy is determined irrespectively of the public
signal and the pursued monetary policy; we can confirm that n∗t = 0 and
y∗t = at . On the nominal side, conjecture that pit = ϑ1E
c
t [xt] + ϑ2 at and
then confirm that pi∗t =
1
φpi
(Ect [xt] − at) . The consumer’s expectations about
permanent (long-run) productivity have only nominal effects: a consumption
smoothing motive leads to changes in the consumer’s current demand depend-
ing on his expectations about permanent productivity; however, flexible prices
appropriately adjust in stage 2 and the nominal wage proportionally adjusts
in stage 1 leaving the real wage intact and preventing the consumer’s expec-





t [at] + ξ2 at (C1)
pit = κ1E
p
t [at] + κ2E
c
t [xt] + κ3 at . (C2)
Conjectures (C1) and (C2) imply the state of the economy can be sum-
marized as Ψt = {Ept [at] , Ect [xt] , at} . This is a direct consequence of the way
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agents form their expectations, described in Section 2.3.2, which disciplines the
treatment of public signals and productivities within the state. The monetary
authority can fully extract the current state by observing the public signal
in stage 1 and inflation in stage 2 (alternatively, production or employment)
which by conjecture (C2) (respectively, (C1)) perfectly reveals productivity
at . In other words, when the monetary authority steps in at the beginning of
stage 2 , it shares the same information set with the consumer. This applies




t = Ψt .
Adding and subtracting pt−1 in the labor market optimality condition
(2.14) and combining the Euler equation (2.13) with rule 1 implies
ζnt = E
p
t [at] + E
p
t [pit] − pit − ct (2.17)
ct = − [φpi pit + φy (yt − at)] + Ect [ct+1 + pit+1] , (2.18)
respectively.
Combining conjectures (C1) and (C2) with the optimality conditions,








[− (1 + φy) ξ1 Ept [at] + Ect [xt] + [(1 + φy) ξ1 − 1] at] (2.20)
ξ1 =
φpi − 1 + k (1− θ)
φpi (1 + ζ) − (1 + φy) , (2.21)
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where k, θ are parameters associated with the consumer’s learning problem
introduced previously and derived in Appendix 2.8.2 .30
Equation (2.19) shows that output is a weighted average31 of productiv-
ity and the producer’s expectations about it. The respective weights depend
on the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, parametrized by ζ, and the monetary
policy parameters φpi , φy .
The presence of φpi , φy in (2.19) leads to the first key remark: monetary
policy is non-neutral. This is attributed to the heterogeneity of the agents’
expectations in stage 1 about inflation in stage 2 as we can see from (2.17) .
Of course, heterogenous expectations are attributed to the agents’ asymmetric
information about current productivity. Crucially, incomplete yet symmetric
information would imply a neutral monetary policy.
A second key remark is that the consumer’s expectations have real ef-
fects despite prices being flexible. Once again, this is a direct consequence
of asymmetric information. To the extent that inflation depends on the con-
sumer’s expectations, the producer needs to second-guess the consumer when




t [xt] ] = E
c
t [xt] + k (1− θ) (Ept [at] − at) .
30There is no solution for φpi = 0 and there seems to be no well-defined solution for
φpi = 1 (yet the latter case I need to explore further) . Therefore, I will assume both of
these values of φpi away.
31This is a direct consequence of preferences logarithmic in consumption.
32One could conjecture that consumption in (C1) also depends directly on the consumer’s
expectations only to verify that, in fact, the consumer’s expectations do not enter equilibrium
output directly. This happens because what matters for the labor decision in stage 1 , and
hence the real side of the economy, is productivity and the producer’s -not the consumer’s-
expectations about it as well as about inflation, as (2.17) attests.
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What matters for the labor decision and hence production -through the infla-
tion channel- is the wedge between the producer’s and the consumer’s expec-
tations about inflation. Given conjecture (C2) and the fact that Ect [pit] = pit,
it follows that
Ept [pit] − Ect [pit] = Ept [pit] − pit = [κ2 k (1− θ) + κ3] (Ept [at] − at) . (2.22)
The presence of the parameter κ2 in (2.22) attests that the consumer’s expec-
tations have real effects.
Importantly, what lies in the intersection of the agents’ information sets
(for example, the producer’s expectations) and what lies outside the union of
the agents’ information sets (possibly, non-fundamental shocks - see fn. 60)
has no real effects through the inflation channel.
I will first discuss purely expectational shocks, which operate only
through agents’ expectations. Insulating the analysis from productivity shocks
will allow me to focus solely on the “mechanics” of agents’ expectations. Subse-
quently I discuss productivity shocks which operate both directly and through
agents’ expectations. Before continuing, let me point out that
κ1 + κ2 + κ3 = 0 (2.23)
κ1 + κ3 = − 1
φpi
. (2.24)
Combining (2.23) and (2.24) implies κ2 =
1
φpi
> 0 , which we can see
in (2.20) ; the consumer’s expectations are positively related to inflation, and,
consequently, indirectly through inflation positively related to output. The
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logic underlying this is a permanent income hypothesis one: if, for instance,
a purely expectational shock leads the consumer to overstate the long-run
prospects of the economy, consumption smoothing results in an increase in
current demand which in turn causes an inflationary pressure. If the producer
had complete information, prices would fully absorb the increased demand
in stage 2 and nominal wages would proportionally adjust in stage 1; both
would imply an unaffected real wage and, as a result, the absence of real
effects. However, this is not the case under incomplete information: an overly
optimistic producer -the public signal coordinates agents- overestimates the
inflationary pressure. This implies the nominal wage increases more than
proportionally compared to inflation, which results in a higher real wage. The
latter causes labor to increase and production to expand, therefore partly
accommodating the increased demand. Purely expectational shocks via the
consumer’s expectations push then toward a demand shock interpretation.
Turning to the producer, we can see from (2.19) - (2.21) that his expec-
tations cause output and inflation to move in opposite directions. In other
words, they point toward a supply-shock interpretation.33 A sufficient con-
dition for the producer’s expectations to be positively related to output and
negatively related to inflation is φpi > max {1+φy1+ζ , 1} .34 That is for suffi-
33 As already argued, since the producer second-guesses the consumer when forming
expectations about inflation, the consumer’s expectations matter indirectly as the term
κ2 k (1 − θ) in (2.22) shows. In fact, since κ2 > 0 , this term only accentuates the supply
shock interpretation as (2.93) in Appendix 2.8.3 shows.
34 For min { 1+φy1+ζ , 1 − k (1− θ)} < φpi < max { 1+φy1+ζ , 1 − k (1− θ)} , positive expec-
tational shocks behave like negative supply shocks: they lower output and raise inflation.
For appropriate policy parameters (φpi , φy) , inflation depends negatively on productivity.
Then the indirect, inflation, channel of expectations lowers the total effect of the producer’s
expectations: an overly optimistic producer expects the worker to be more productive than
he is, while inflation lower than it will actually be. For the suggested parameter values,
the negative indirect effect outweighs the positive direct one. As a result, the nominal
wage increases by less than inflation, hence, the real wage falls compared to its complete
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ciently “active” policies, expectational shocks via the producer’s expectations
push toward a co-monotone supply shock interpretation. As I have already
implied, the inefficiency caused due to the producer’s incomplete information
manifests itself as a distortion in the labor optimality condition. In particular,
it causes a shift in labor demand: the overly optimistic, for instance, expecta-
tions of the producer will result in a higher real wage. This induces the worker
to increase his labor supply and, as a result, production to expand. For a
given demand level, this causes a deflationary pressure; prices need to fall for
the commodity market to clear.
Will a demand- or a supply-shock interpretation prevail for purely ex-
pectational shocks? Suppose that the expectational shock affects the agents’
expectations in the same way.35 Then it follows that a positive expectational
shock lowers inflation as long as κ1 + κ2 < 0 . By (2.23) and (2.24) , this is
equivalent to requiring κ3 > 0 . Inspecting (2.20), we can see that the term
κ2 does not respond to changes in the monetary policy weight on the output
gap, φy , whereas κ3 increases in it;
36 the sign of κ3 depends on how the pol-
icy weight on the output gap relates to the Frisch elasticity of labor supply
1/ζ . In particular, a value of φy greater than or equal to the inverse Frisch
elasticity of labor supply ζ is a sufficient condition for κ3 to be positive and,
consequently, expectational shocks to be negatively related to inflation.37
The picture that emerges is that expectational shocks can exhibit fea-
tures associated with supply or demand shocks depending on the monetary
information counterpart, which induces the worker to decrease his labor supply.
35 That is I assume k θ = µ in the learning problems of the agents. This is a good approx-
imation if the temporary productivity shock has a high variance relative to the expectational
shock, which is consistent with the parametrization in Table 2.1 below.
36A sufficient condition for this is that φpi > 1 .
37The term κ3 exhibits discontinuity at φpi (1 + ζ) − 1 . As a result, this is true as long
as φy < φpi (1 + ζ) − 1 .
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policy pursued. The policy weight on the current output gap is central to
how expectational shocks manifest themselves. In particular, as long as φpi >
max {1+φy
1+ζ
, 1} , a higher weight on the output gap pushes toward a supply-
shock interpretation. To provide an intuition for this, first note that (2.20)
implies expected inflation is zero, that is the nominal and the real interest rate
coincide:
rt = it = φpi pit + φy (yt − at) . (2.25)
Fix for a moment the real interest rate and consider the case of overly opti-
mistic expectations which implies a positive output gap. Controlling for gen-
eral equilibrium effects, the higher the policy weight on the output gap, the
lower the inflationary pressure has to be for the real rate to remain constant.38
However, the real -and, hence, the nominal- interest rate increases in
response to a positive purely expectational shock. This is a consequence of the
overreaction of expectations: expected future output increases by more than
current output since the latter is in part disciplined by current productivity,
whose long-run component agents overstate. To what extent or whether this
increase will be translated into higher inflation depends on the weight put on
the (positive) output gap.
Turning to productivity shocks, φpi > (1 + φy) max { 11+ζ , k (1−θ)ζ−φy } is a
sufficient condition for them to be positively related to output. On the nominal
side, maintaining the assumption that expectational shocks affect the agents’
expectations in the same way, a direct implication of (2.23) and (2.24) is that
productivity and expectational shocks cannot both increase or lower inflation.
38One may wonder what happens when the policy weight on inflation, φpi , changes. In
fact, general equilibrium effects complicate things considerably as both κ2 and κ3 (alterna-
tively, κ1) depend on φpi. As a result, a similar reasoning applies only locally and it becomes
hard to generalize. Hence, I will abstract from this consideration.
31
To connect the results with the previous analysis, consider a positive produc-
tivity shock. Under complete information, inflation would depend positively
on the wedge between the consumer’s expectations and productivity. Follow-
ing a positive productivity shock the consumer’s expectations underreact; as a
result, demand underreacts as well which implies that prices must fall for the
market to clear. However, under incomplete information, prices will not fall
as much as they would under complete information, whereas they can even in-
crease. The reason is that the producer’s expectations also underreact, hence
supply underreacts as well.
Along the lines of the above analysis, the weight on the output gap
proves to be key as to how supply responds. Revisiting the real side, the un-
derreaction of the producer’s expectations implies that the increase in output
falls short of the increase in productivity, therefore the output gap is negative
and employment falls. Holding the real and, since they coincide, the nominal
interest rate constant, the higher the weight on the output gap, the lower the
nominal interest rate will be, hence the less the required fall in prices (see also
(2.25)) . However, both the nominal and the real interest rate fall after a pos-
itive productivity shock, a consequence of the underreaction of expectations.
Last, note that for Ept [at] = at the complete information equilibrium
prevails.
2.4.3 Labor wedge
Formalizing the intuition above, the producer’s incomplete information has
an impact on his labor demand and, consequently, distorts the labor optimal-
ity condition. This causes fluctuations in the labor wedge. Following Chari
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et al. (2007) and Shimer (2009), the labor wedge is defined as the ratio of the
marginal product of labor to the marginal rate of substitution of leisure for
consumption by construction equal to 1
1−τn,t in the expression below:
−Un,t
Uc,t
= (1− τn,t)MPn,t .
Un,t and Uc,t denote the marginal disutility of labor and marginal utility of
consumption, respectively, and MPn,t denotes the marginal product of labor






Under complete information, N∗t = 1 and the labor wedge is equal to
1 . Under incomplete information this will generally not be the case; switching
to logs and using nt = yt − at from the firm’s technology implies
nt =
φpi − 1 + k (1− θ)
φpi (1 + ζ) − (1 + φy) (E
p
t [at] − at) . (2.26)
For φpi > max {1+φy1+ζ , 1} , employment depends positively on the distance
of the producer’s expectations from the underlying productivity. The labor
wedge in logs is given by the LHS below:
− log (1− τn,t) = − [φpi − 1 + k (1− θ)] (1 + ζ)
φpi (1 + ζ) − (1 + φy) (E
p
t [at] − at) . (2.27)
Maintaining that φpi > max {1+φy1+ζ , 1} , in case Ept [at] > at , the log-labor
wedge is negative, and positive, otherwise. Then purely expectational shocks
induce a countercyclical labor wedge. This is easy to see: a positive, for in-
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stance, purely expectational shock raises output whereas it lowers the labor
wedge. This is in line with the documented countercyclicality of the labor
wedge (see for example Chari et al. (2007) and Shimer (2009)) and suggests
that purely expectational shocks can possibly account for it. Interestingly,
fluctuations in the labor wedge depend on the monetary policy pursued. Sec-
tion 2.6 elaborates on this.
2.4.4 Equilibrium dynamics
I deal with this case numerically, even though a closed-form representation
of the dynamics can be obtained along the lines of Section 2.5.3 below. The
baseline parametrization is in Table 2.1. In that I follow Lorenzoni (2009) and
one may check the references therein. The parametrization implies the Kalman
gain terms, µ and k , are 0.22 and 0.23 , respectively, whereas the relative
weight the consumer places on the public signal, θ , is 0.96 . In addition, I
initially set the response to the output gap φy = 0.5 .
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Before continuing with the impulse response functions,40 let me repeat
that the stochastic steady state is pinned down by the permanent productivity
component x , which by (2.6) evolves as a random walk. In particular, at the
39The monetary policy parameters are based on Taylor (1993) .
40“An impulse response function is [...] the dynamic path of some variables [...] in response
to some shock [...] (Mankiw, 2001, page C54) .” More precisely, letting rows represent the
three shocks,  , u , and e, respectively, and columns represent periods t , t+ 1 , . . . , in the
case, for instance, of a one-standard-deviation  shock, I explore the dynamic response of




Table 2.1: Calibrated parameters
Inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply ζ 0.5
Monetary policy weight on inflation φpi 1.5
Standard deviation of permanent productivity shock σ 0.0077
Standard deviation of temporary productivity shock σu 0.15
Standard deviation of expectational shock σe 0.03
steady state y = c = x, n = 0, pi = 0, and r = i = − log β .41,42 In
all figures, impulse response functions are for one-standard-deviation shocks.
Periods, appearing on the horizontal axis of the figures, are interpreted as
quarters. Further, with no loss of generality, I assume that x = 0 before any
shocks hit.
Figure 2.5 shows the impulse responses to positive purely expectational
shocks. As already argued, as expectations increase, output and employment
increase, the labor wedge falls and the interest rates increase. For the con-
sidered parametrization, inflation falls. With no change in the underlying
productivity, all effects die out in the long run and variables return to their
steady-state values.
Figure 2.6 shows that after a positive permanent productivity shock
41The steady state level of an economy, pinned down by the permanent (long-run) pro-
ductivity component x , is conceptually different from the efficient, complete information
level of the economy which is pinned down by temporal aggregate productivity at . To see
how the two connect with each other, when the economy is at its steady state, it is also at
its complete information level but not vice versa. More precisely, at the steady state a = x
and Ep[a] = Ec[x] = x , whereas at the complete information level of the economy, we
only need Ept [at] = at . In the impulse response functions analysis, I assume that, before
any shocks hit, the economy has already reached its steady state which, based on the above,
coincides with its complete information level. The two will remain coincidental after a per-
manent productivity or a purely expectational shock and they will differ only on impact
after a temporary productivity shock.
42 For ease of exposition, I have suppressed constants, hence in all figures the nominal
and the real interest rate equal zero at the steady state.
35
agents expectations underreact. This causes an increase in output, however
by less than under complete information, which in turn causes a fall in em-
ployment. As employment falls, the labor wedge increases and is therefore
procyclical. For the considered parametrization, inflation increases, whereas,
since expectations underreact, the nominal and the real interest rate fall. As
expectations converge to the underlying higher productivity level, all variables
converge to their steady-state levels.
The impulse responses to a temporary productivity shock (Figure 2.7)
are initially similar to the ones of a permanent productivity shock and, sub-
sequently, to the ones of an expectational shock. As argued above, this is
because they affect productivity only on impact, whereas from the following
period onwards they serve as purely expectational shocks.
As I have already pointed out, the impulse responses when rule 1 is
followed are generally sensitive to the specification of the monetary policy
rule and, in particular, to the policy weight on the output gap, φy . Con-
sider now the case in which the authority does not respond to the output gap,
that is φy = 0 , with all other parameters as in Table 2.1 . Figures 2.8 - 2.10
show the impulse responses to one-standard-deviation positive purely expec-
tational, permanent productivity, and temporary productivity shocks, respec-
tively. While everything else remains unchanged, the implications for inflation
are reversed. In particular, positive permanent productivity shocks lower infla-
tion whereas positive expectational shocks increase inflation. The last results
are in line with Lorenzoni (2009). Notably, unlike in Lorenzoni (2009), they
are generated in a perfectly competitive environment where prices are flexible
and the real interest rate can freely adjust.
Juxtaposing figures 2.5 and 2.8 illustrates the first main result of the es-
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say: purely expectational shocks can behave like supply or demand shocks. A
natural question is why the current framework can accommodate both cases.
The reasons are, first, the explicit role assigned to the producer’s expecta-
tions and, second, the presence of asymmetric information between consumers
and producers. Crucially, the latter pushes monetary policy and the con-
sumer’s expectations through the door.43 The producer’s expectations point
toward a supply-shock interpretation, whereas the consumer’s expectations,
as in Lorenzoni (2009), point toward a demand-shock interpretation. The
monetary authority decides which one will prevail.
2.5 Equilibria under Rule 2: Beyond Demand
and Supply
2.5.1 Complete information benchmark
Like before, under incomplete information y∗t = at and n
∗
t = 0. Conjecture
for prices that pt = ϑ3E
c
t [xt] + ϑ4 at. The Euler equation (2.13) becomes
Ect [at+1] − at = (φpi − 1) (Ect [pt+1] − pt) . (2.28)
A family of solutions is given by p∗t =
1
φpi−1 at + ϑ3E
c
t [xt] ; price levels depend
arbitrarily on the consumer’s expectations.
43It is key that the consumer has complete information about the current state; this
enables me to abstract from wealth effects which are the subject of Beaudry and Portier






t [at] + ξ4 at (C3)
pt = κ4E
p
t [at] + κ5E
c
t [xt] + κ6 at . (C4)
Conjectures (C3) and (C4) imply the state can sufficiently be described
by Ψt = {Ept [at], Ect [xt], at} . The information sets of the agents and the
monetary authority are like before. Since Imt = I
c
t , the Euler equation (2.13)
becomes
Ect [ct+1] − ct = (φpi − 1) (Ect [pt+1] − pt) . (2.29)
Taking familiar steps (see Appendix 2.8.4) yields
ξ3 =
1 + κ6 + k (1− θ)κ5
1 + ζ
(2.30)
ξ4 = 1 − ξ3 (2.31)
ξ3 = (φpi − 1)κ4 (2.32)
κ4 + κ6 =
1
φpi − 1 . (2.33)
There are 4 equations and 5 unknowns. Equations (2.30) - (2.31) follow from
44See also fn. 32 for why I do not include Ect [xt] in (C3) .
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the labor market optimality condition (2.14) , whereas (2.32) - (2.33) follow
from the Euler equation (2.29) . When matching coefficients, an equation is
missing from the latter because the real interest rate is determined irrespec-
tively of the consumer’s expectations.
Combining (2.30) - (2.33) yields
ξ3 =
φpi
φpi + ζ(φpi − 1) +
(φpi − 1) k (1− θ)
φpi + ζ(φpi − 1) κ5 . (2.34)
Prices can be expressed as
pt =
1
φpi − 1 yt + κ5E
c
t [xt] . (2.35)
As in the case of rule 1 , asymmetric information implies monetary
policy and the consumer’s expectations have real effects as the presence of φpi
and κ5, respectively, in (2.34) attests.
However, a crucial difference with the case of rule 1 is the existence of
multiple equilibria each corresponding to a different value of κ5 . An imme-
diate monetary policy implication is that targeting expected inflation invites
multiple (linear) equilibria, notably for any value φpi in the interest-rate rule.
Interestingly, the role of the consumer’s expectations is arbitrarily specified
across equilibria, which is the second main finding of the essay. As already
pointed out, this is because the real interest rate is independent of the con-
sumer’s expectations. Additionally, rule 2 specifies price levels as opposed to
inflation in the case of rule 1 .
As expected, depending on κ5, expectational and productivity shocks
can raise or lower employment and price levels. Further, equation (2.34) sug-
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gests that short-run output volatility caused by expectational shocks increases
in the absolute value of κ5 .
2.5.3 A baseline equilibrium
To explore the dynamics of the producer’s expectations in the equilibrium
under rule 2, I will suppress the role of the consumer’s expectations. This
corresponds to setting κ5 = 0 in (2.34) and (2.35) . It is straightforward to
extend the results to equilibria with κ5 6= 0 .
Complete information benchmark
Like before, on the real side complete information implies y∗t = at and n
∗
t = 0 .





Setting κ5 = 0 in (2.34) and (2.35) pins down the equilibrium given by equa-
tions (2.36) - (2.37) below:46
45 Since Ect [at+1] = E
c
t [xt] 6= at (see also Section 2.3.2) , the possibility of prices being
fixed in equilibrium appears only as a limit case for φpi → ∞ . It is also a possibility in the
special case where σ2e = σ
2
u = 0 . Constant prices could also have prevailed (as a unique
non-explosive path) if either productivity at evolved as a random walk, or if the economy
was a static one.
46 Conjectures (C3) and (C4) for κ5 = 0 combined with (2.11) imply wt = (1 + κ4 +
κ6)E
p
t [at] ; the nominal wage perfectly reveals E
p
t [at] to the consumer and the monetary
authority in stage 1 . Hence, if the signal st , instead of publicly observed, was privately
observed by the producer, the nominal wage would generally perfectly communicate it to




φpi + ζ(φpi − 1) (φpi E
p
t [at] + ζ(φpi − 1) at) (2.36)
pt =
1
φpi − 1 yt . (2.37)
Like before, equation (2.36) shows that output is a weighted average
(also fn. 31) of productivity and the producer’s expectations about it. The
respective weights depend on the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, parametrized
by ζ , and the monetary policy parameter φpi . By (2.37) , prices are a monotone
transformation of output.47 For an “active” monetary policy (φpi > 1) , output
and prices depend positively on the producer’s expectations about productivity
and productivity itself.48
It follows from (2.36) and (2.37) that
pit =
1








Inflation, by equation (2.38) , is a weighted average of the change in producer’s
expectations and the change in productivity in the last two periods.
Let me make some remarks. First, each value of φpi is associated with
a unique equilibrium; the equilibrium with constant prices is obtained in the
47Output and prices are non-stationary. See also the analysis in Section 2.3 .
48 For 11+ζ < φpi < 1 output depends positively on the producer’s expectations about
productivity and negatively on productivity, whereas for 0 < φpi <
1
1+ζ it depends nega-
tively on the producer’s expectations and positively on productivity. The opposite relations
are true for price levels. Employment has the same sign as the weight of expectations in
output as (2.39) below shows.
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limit as φpi → ∞ . Second, observe that the optimal monetary policy in the
baseline equilibrium under rule 2 is a zero-response to expected inflation policy,
φpi = 0 . In this case, all variables are at their complete information (efficient)
level. I elaborate on this in Section 2.6 where I further consider an enriched
version of rule 2. Last, note that for Ept [at] = at the complete information
equilibrium prevails.
Labor wedge
It follows from (2.36) and the firm’s technology (2.4) that
nt =
φpi
φpi + ζ(φpi − 1) (E
p
t [at] − at) . (2.39)
Equation (2.39) shows that employment depends proportionally on the wedge
between the producer’s expectations about productivity and productivity it-
self. Taking the same steps as in the case of rule 1, the labor wedge in logs is
given by
− log (1− τn,t) = − φpi(1 + ζ)
φpi + ζ(φpi − 1) (E
p




, in case Ept [at] > at , the log-labor wedge is negative, and
positive, otherwise. In addition, it is decreasing in the monetary policy pa-
rameter, φpi ,
49 and becomes zero for φpi = 0 . We can once again observe that
purely expectational shocks induce a countercyclical labor wedge, which is in
line with the documented countercyclicality of the labor wedge.





Turning to the impulse response functions, the signs I report below refer to
φpi > 1 ; that is the monetary authority follows an “active” policy, along
the lines of Taylor (1999) .50 Figures 2.11 - 2.16 show the impulse response
functions to one-standard-deviation shocks for the parametrization in Table
2.1. Periods are interpreted as quarters.
If a unit purely expectational shock, et, arises, the consumer’s expec-
tations in period t + s increase by (1 − k)s k θ . The producer’s expectations
increase on impact by µ and in period t+s for s ≥ 1 by (1−k)s−1 (1−µ) k θ .














= (1− k)s−1 φpi (1− µ) k θ
φpi + ζ(φpi − 1) > 0 , for s ≥ 1 (2.42)
(2.43)






(φpi − 1) [φpi + ζ(φpi − 1)] > 0 (2.44)
dpit+1
det
= − φpi [µ − (1− µ) k θ]
(φpi − 1) [φ + ζ(φpi − 1)] (2.45)
dpit+s
det
= − (1− k)s−2 φpi (1− µ) k
2 θ
(φpi − 1) [φ + ζ(φpi − 1)] < 0 , for s ≥ 2 . (2.46)
Equations (2.41) and (2.42) (also Figure 2.11) demonstrate the positive
co-movement result, already discussed: output and employment increase in
response to a positive expectational shock. The result is due to the producer
overstating the worker’s productivity. In the limit as s → ∞ , expectations
converge to the true level of productivity implying both output and employ-
ment return to their steady-state levels.
A key difference between the equilibrium under rule 1 and the equi-
librium under rule 2 is that the former specifies inflation whereas the latter
price levels. In the baseline case considered here, prices are positively related
to the producer’s expectations. Hence, a positive expectational shock causes
an increase in price levels (Figure 2.12) . However, as agents update their
beliefs over time, their expectations become more aligned with fundamentals
and, hence prices return monotonically to their steady-state level, p = 1
φpi−1 x ,
generating thereby a deflationary pressure as (2.46) shows from the following
period onwards.51 Put differently, price levels respond non-monotonically to
positive expectational shocks. They are higher compared to their complete
information level, yet inflation, by definition, measures changes in price levels
51 Whether there is inflation or disinflation in period t + 1 depends on the variances of
the shocks. The parametrization here implies the latter.
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between periods.52All effects vanish as s → ∞ .
To pin down the impulse responses of the nominal and the real interest




ζ(φpi − 1) k θ − φpi (µ− k θ)
(φpi − 1) [φpi + ζ(φpi − 1)] (2.47)
dEct+s [pit+s+1]
det
= (1− k)s−1φpi (µ− k) + [ζ(φpi − 1) (1− k)] k θ
(φpi − 1) [φpi + ζ(φpi − 1)] , for s ≥ 1 .
(2.48)
The nominal interest rate is it+s = φpi E
c
t+s [pit+s+1] and the real interest rate
is rt+s = (φpi − 1)Ect+s [pit+s+1] .53
Inflation expectations increase,54 given the parametrization, resulting
in higher nominal and real interest rates. In the limit s → ∞ , inflation
expectations, the nominal, and the real interest rate all return to their steady-
state values.
If a shock to the permanent productivity component t = 1 arises,
the consumer’s expectations about productivity in period t + s increase by
1 − (1− k)s+1 as (2.16) implies, whereas the producer’s expectations increase
by 1 − (1−µ) [1− (1−k)s] as (2.15) implies. The impulse response functions
52A similar result is obtained in Lorenzoni (2005), though not associated with disinflation.
The increase in prices can become less severe and prices can even fall for reasonable values
of φpi under an extended forward-looking rule targeting expected growth in addition to
expected inflation. The logic is similar to the rule 1 case: for a given real interest rate,
the greater the weight placed on expected growth, the lower expected inflation will be,
controlling for general equilibrium effects.
53 In addition, notice that Ect [yt+s] = E
c
t [xt] for s ≥ 1 and Ect [pit+s] = 0 for s > 1 .
These results follow from (2.36) and (2.38) combined with (2.16) .
54This is unlike the case of rule 1. The difference between the two lies in that rule 1





= 1 − (1− k)s φpi (1 − µ)
φpi + ζ(φpi − 1) ∈ (0, 1) (2.49)
dnt+s
dt
= − (1− k)s φpi (1 − µ)







1 − φpi (1 − µ)





= (1− k)s−1 φpi (1 − µ) k
(φpi − 1) [φpi + ζ(φpi − 1)] > 0 , for s ≥ 1 . (2.52)
A unit increase in the permanent productivity shock causes an equiva-
lent change in steady-state output and no change in steady-state employment.
We can see from (2.49) and (2.50) (see also Figure 2.13) that a positive per-
manent productivity shock causes output to increase by less than one and
employment to fall temporarily. By (2.40), the labor wedge increases tem-
porarily. This happens because expectations underreact after a positive per-
manent productivity shock. As a result, labor demand shifts inwards and the
real wage falls relative to its efficient level. Equation (2.52) suggests produc-
tivity shocks are inflationary (see also Figure 2.14). The positive dependence
of prices on expectations for φpi > 1, as (2.36) and (2.37) imply, underlies this
result. Hence, as expectations converge to the new permanent productivity
level, prices get closer to their steady-state level, implying inflation along the
way.





= (1− k)s φpi (k − µ) − ζ(φpi − 1) (1− k)
(φpi − 1) [φpi + ζ(φpi − 1)] . (2.53)
Figure 2.14 shows that following a permanent productivity shock in-
flation expectations fall and so do the nominal and the real interest rate. In
the limit as s → ∞ , expectations become aligned with the new productivity
level, output and prices converge to their new steady-state levels, whereas the
remaining variables return to their pre-shock levels.
A temporary productivity shock causes on impact responses similar to
those in the permanent productivity shock case; from the following period
onwards, it only affects the agents’ expectations, hence the responses resemble
the ones in the expectational shock case. The consumer’s expectations in
period t+ s increase by (1−k)s k (1− θ) , whereas the producer’s expectations
are unchanged on impact, as changes in the temporary productivity component
affect their expectations with one-period lag, and increase by (1 − k)s−1 (1 −















φpi + ζ(φpi − 1) > 0 . (2.56)
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= (1− k)s−1 φpi (1− µ) k (1− θ)
φpi + ζ(φpi − 1) > 0 , for s ≥ 1 (2.57)
dpit+1
dut
= − ζ (φpi − 1) − φpi (1− µ) k(1− θ)
(φpi − 1) [φpi + ζ(φpi − 1)] (2.58)
dpit+s
dut
= − (1− k)s−2 φpi (1− µ) k
2 (1− θ)
(φpi − 1) [φpi + ζ(φpi − 1)] < 0 , for s ≥ 2 . (2.59)




φpi k (1− θ) − ζ (φpi − 1) [1 − k (1− θ)]
(φpi − 1)[φpi + ζ(φpi − 1)] (2.60)
dEct+s [pit+s+1]
dut
= (1− k)s−1 [φpi (µ− k) + ζ(φ− 1) (1− k)] k (1− θ)
(φpi − 1) [φpi + ζ(φpi − 1)] , for s ≥ 1 .
(2.61)
Figures 2.15 and 2.16 display the impulse response functions.
2.5.4 Short-run volatility
In what is a separate exercise, I compare the short-run (one-period) output
volatility caused by purely expectational shocks, et , among the equilibria for
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the considered interest-rate rules.55 The parametrization is the one in Table
2.1 . I normalize to one the short-run output volatility generated by rule 1 for
φy = 0 to make comparisons easier. Table 2.2 reports the results.
Table 2.2: Short-run volatility
Rule 1 (φy = 0) 1
Rule 1 (φy = 0.5) 2.78
Rule 2 (baseline) 4.43
We can see that the baseline case of rule 2 generates considerably higher
short-run output volatility than the considered cases of rule 1 . This can be
further increased by assigning a role to the consumer’s expectations (see also
(2.34)) . Considering the analyzed equilibria for rule 1 , “supply” shocks (φy =
0.5) generate considerably higher volatility than “demand” shocks (φy = 0) .
Indeed, for φpi high enough so that φpi (1 + ζ) − (1 + φy) > 0 , the short-run
output volatility due to expectational shocks increases in φy .
2.5.5 Monetary authority with superior information
In this section I lift the assumption that the monetary authority has no supe-
rior information compared to the agents. Instead, I assume that the monetary
authority has information about the following period’s state. To prevent the
55Short-run output volatility in the cases of rule 1 and 2, respectively, is(
φpi − 1 + k (1− θ)









forward-looking56 nominal interest rate from being fully revealing about the
following period’s state, I require that the monetary authority either reports
the following period’s price with a measurement error or transmits “surprise”
monetary policy shocks. In both cases the nominal interest rate serves as a
public signal about the following period’s productivity. However, in the former
case the monetary authority misreports the following period’s prices uninten-
tionally, as opposed to intentionally in the latter. The aim of this section
is twofold: first, to analyze the informational implications per se when the
monetary authority communicates its superior information with noise; second,
to equip the monetary authority with an additional monetary policy tool, the
monetary policy shocks, and pin down its equilibrium effects. I further explore
monetary policy shocks in Section 2.6 . The focus throughout this section will
be on the baseline case of rule 2 , which corresponds to setting κ5 = 0 in
(2.34) and (2.35) . Extending the results to the other equilibria should be
straightforward although this is something I have not explored yet.
When the monetary authority reports the following period’s price with
a measurement error, the prevailing nominal interest rate in t− 1 is
it−1 = φpi p˜it , (2.62)
where p˜it ≡ p˜t − pt−1 , with
p˜t = pt + wt . (2.63)
56 Since agents have complete information about the current state when the monetary
authority steps in, there can only be information extraction from the nominal interest rate
in -what seems to me- a meaningful way if the monetary authority is forward-looking.
Therefore, I restrict attention only to rule 2 .
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The error term is i.i.d with wt ∼ N(0, σ2w) and is independent of the shocks t,
et, and ut .





(it−1 + φpi pt−1) .
In the case of monetary policy shocks the nominal interest rate is
it−1 = φpi pit + ωt , (2.64)
where ω is i.i.d. with ωt ∼ N(0, σ2ω) and is independent of the shocks t, et,
ut, and wt .
Agents now extract
pˆt = φpi pt + ωt , (2.65)
which in terms of observables as of stage 2 of period t− 1 can be expressed as
pˆt = it−1 + φpi pt−1 .
2.5.6 Linear equilibria
Equilibrium is given by equations (2.36) - (2.38) . The state of the economy is
now augmented by the public signal about period t’s productivity which the
monetary authority transmits. I denote this by zt in the case of a measurement
error and zˆt in the case of a monetary policy shock. The state can sufficiently
be described then by Ωt = ({aτ}tτ=0 , {sτ}tτ=0 , zt) , replacing Ωt with Ωˆt and
zt with zˆt in the case of a monetary policy shock. What distinguishes the two
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cases is the information set of the monetary authority in t− 1 : in the case of
measurement errors it is Imt−1 = Ωt \ {zt} , whereas in the case of monetary
policy shocks it is Imt−1 = Ωˆt . That is, in the latter case, the monetary
authority takes into account the effects of the signal it transmits. I assume it
is common knowledge what the case is each time a shock hits. As I show in
Appendix 2.8.4, the endogenous public signals associated with the two cases
are
zt = at +
φpi + ζ(φpi − 1)
ζ
wt (2.66)
zˆt = at +
φpi + ζ(φpi − 1)
φpi ζ
ωt . (2.67)
Agents (perfectly) disentangle the endogenous public signals upon the
realization of the public signal st in stage 1 of period t .
57 The producer’s in-
formation set then becomes Ipt,1 = Ωt\{at} , whereas the consumer’s Ict = Ωt .
As I show in Appendix 2.8.4, the producer’s expectations about productivity
are
Ept [at | Ipt,1] = δ Ept
[
xt | Ipt,1 \ {zt}
]
+ (1− δ) zt , (2.68)
where δ is a coefficient in (0, 1) (respectively use δˆ, zˆt and Ωˆt in the case of a
monetary policy shock) . Importantly, δ and δˆ depend on the monetary policy
parameter φpi .
58
It is apparent from (2.66) and (2.67) that the economy’s response to
measurement errors and monetary policy shocks is very similar. In particular,
57 This happens because they know the stochastic process of prices given by (2.37) .
58 The case analyzed in Section 2.3 corresponds to δ = 1 which would prevail if the
conditional variance of the endogenous signals was infinite.
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for φpi > 1 positive interest rate shocks raise the producer’s expectations about
productivity in the following period. This happens because for φpi > 1 prices
are positively related to productivity. Therefore, a higher nominal interest
rate overstates the following period’s price and leads the producer to partially
attribute it to an increase in productivity.59
2.5.7 Equilibrium dynamics
The dynamics when shocks t, et, and ut are realized are very similar to the
ones in Section 2.5.3 .
Unlike there, the effects of a measurement error or a monetary policy
shock last only one period. This is because it generates a signal about at,
which consumers learn and producers realize once the labor decision is made .



















ζ (φpi − 1) > 0 . (2.70)
It can be seen from (2.69) and (2.70) that interest rate shocks boost
59 In case the monetary authority has no superior information and this is common knowl-
edge, monetary policy shocks have no real effects because they are unanticipated by both
agents, hence they have no effect on the labor decision in stage 1 . They can immediately
be extracted by the agents which implies they have no effect on the consumer’s inflation
and output expectations for the following period. As a result, they only affect the current
price, in a co-monotone way for φpi > 1 . On the contrary, in the superior information
case agents extract monetary policy shocks with a one-period lag, hence their (nominal and
real) effects are realized in the following period. They have real effects because they are not
simultaneously fully extracted by both agents.
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output and prices. These responses are in the same direction as the ones after
a shock to the public signal st . This is because measurement errors and mon-
etary policy shocks serve as purely expectational shocks: when positive, they
increase the producer’s expectations about productivity without any change
in the underlying fundamentals.




















ζ(φpi − 1) > 0 . (2.72)
The previous comments apply. However, in the next section I show that the
two cases generate partly different monetary policy implications.
2.6 Monetary Policy
The equilibrium nominal wage in stage 1 is given by
wt = E
p
t [at] + E
p
t [pt] .
Consequently, through the nominal wage, the real side of the economy reflects
the producer’s expectations about productivity. The producer’s expectations
enter the nominal wage both directly and indirectly through inflation in the
case of rule 1 and prices in the case of rule 2 . Monetary policy can have real
effects through the indirect inflation (price) channel. To see this, observe that
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the labor market optimality condition (2.17) can more generally be written
ζnt = E
p
t [at] + E
p
t [pit] − Ect [pit] − Ect [ct] . (2.73)
Taking the producer’s uncertainty as given, monetary policy has real effects as
long as agents form heterogeneous expectations about the inflation to prevail
in stage 2 , that is Ept [pit] 6= Ect [pit] . By construction, this is the case here.
Crucially, what matters for labor decision and, hence the real side, is the wedge
in the agents’s expectations about inflation, Ept [pit] − Ect [pit] . Anything com-
mon in the agents’ information sets and anything lying outside both agents’
information sets (for instance, non-fundamental shocks - see fn. 60 below)
has no real effects through the inflation channel. Then, it should not perhaps
come as a surprise that incomplete yet symmetric information about current
productivity would imply a neutral monetary policy.
The producer’s incomplete information is the only source of inefficiency.
Optimal monetary policy restores then the complete information equilibrium.
An infinitely aggressive policy on inflation policy implies pit = 0 and only
removes the indirect, inflation (price) channel of expectations. As a result, it
is typically suboptimal.
By direct implication of (2.14) , the complete information equilibrium
is restored if and only if
Ept [at] + E
p
t [pit] − (pit + at) = 0 (2.74)
Ept [at] + E
p
t [pt] − (pt + at) = 0 , (2.75)
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for rules 1 and 2 , respectively.
It follows that monetary policy succeeds, not by removing the producer’s
uncertainty, but rather by making it irrelevant. To see this, note that inflation
(prices) depends on productivity and agents’ expectations in a way decided
by monetary policy. Optimal monetary policy manipulates inflation in such a
way that the producer correctly anticipates his stage-2 revenue, which is all
he is interested in.
One would argue that the inefficiency here arises exactly because of
agents’s asymmetric information; if agents had incomplete yet symmetric in-
formation, then the complete information equilibrium would prevail. How-
ever, this is true only because of logarithmic preferences in consumption; in
more general environments, the producer’s incomplete information would suf-
fice. Nevertheless, it is asymmetric, rather than incomplete but symmetric,
information in combination with the existence of a nominal bond market that
enables the monetary authority to drive the economy closer to the complete
information equilibrium. If a real bond market was in the place of the nomi-
nal bond market, then the inflation (price) channel would be absent, and there
would be no way to drive the economy to the first best.
Optimal policy here has different implications from the one in Weiss
(1980) which implies that prices perfectly communicate fundamentals. By
construction, this is a nonexistent possibility here. However, this essay shares
with Weiss (1980), King (1982) and Lorenzoni (2010) the insight that, at the
time the labor decision is made, it is asymmetric, as opposed to incomplete
but symmetric, information about variables the monetary policy will be based
on that breaks the policy irrelevance proposed in Sargent and Wallace (1975,
1976) . Implicit in this is that the monetary authority is more informed when
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it steps in than the least informed agent (here, the producer) at the time
the labor decision is made. This is true here since the time advantage of
the monetary authority is essentially an informational advantage; in fact, the
monetary authority perfectly observes or extracts the variables in question
(inflation, output, current productivity) when it steps in.
Crucially, that inflation stabilization is suboptimal is in contrast with
the baseline case in Lorenzoni (2009) in which the limit φpi → ∞ restores
the efficient equilibrium. In Lorenzoni (2009) , producers have complete in-
formation, however nominal rigidities prevent prices from fully absorbing the
consumer’s expectations about long-run productivity. Stabilizing inflation re-
solves this. In contrast, here prices flexibly adjust, however producers have
incomplete information about productivity and, consequently, their (stage-2)
revenue; stabilizing inflation only eliminates their uncertainty about inflation
but not about their revenue.
Below I consider both interest-rate rules and explore how the mone-
tary authority can mitigate the effects of incomplete information and drive
the economy closer to its complete information counterpart in each case. In
the context of rule 2 , I design policy targets which restore the complete infor-
mation equilibrium for any choice of policy parameters.60
60My focus so far has been on the effects of purely expectational shocks as well on those
of productivity shocks. However, a fair question, especially when it comes to monetary
policy, is about the possible presence of indeterminacies. The answer is that here there is
no real indeterminacy. To see this, first note that the labor decision is intratemporal and
is anyway made before inflation prevails. Turning to inflation, even if it is indeterminate,
i.e. susceptible to possibly non-fundamental (“sunspot”) shocks, since the “sunspot” shocks
lie outside the information sets of both agents, they cannot affect the labor decision in
stage 1 , i.e. they cannot have real effects (see (2.73) and the analysis that comes with it) .
Nevertheless, there may well be nominal indeterminacy. To rule out “sunspot” shocks in
the case, for instance, of rule 1, on which the positive part of this essay is based , we would
need φpi > 1 . But I should repeat here, that I abstract from such considerations.
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2.6.1 Rule 1
If interest-rate rule 1 is followed, setting φpi = 1− k (1−θ) is optimal; however,
this policy is unrealistic as it requires the monetary authority to be fully aware
of the agents’ learning problems which is hardly realistic. Crucially, in the limit
as φpi → ∞, pit → 0 ;61 inflation is constant and the indirect (inflation/price)
channel of expectations, through which the consumer’s expectations also op-
erate, is muted. However, even in this limit case, the producer’s expectations
continue to matter via the direct channel. Hence, inflation stabilization can
at best eliminate the uncertainty arising through the inflation channel and, as
such, is suboptimal.
An implication of Section 2.5.4 is that, for moderate values of φy , short-
run output volatility due to purely expectational shocks increases in φy . How-
ever, perhaps not surprisingly, in the limit φy → ∞ , the economy is at its
complete information counterpart; a policy infinitely responsive to deviations
of output from its complete information level is therefore optimal.
2.6.2 Rule 2
A first policy implication generated by the equilibrium analysis (see Section
2.5) is that a forward-looking rule, like rule 2 , invites multiple equilibria in
which the consumer’s expectations is arbitrarily specified, which is not the case
when a contemporaneously-looking rule is followed.62 Second, as I showed in
Section 2.5.4 , the short-run volatility of output due to expectational shocks
61 As φpi increases, the sign of the change in the weight of the producer’s expectations,
ξ1 , is given by the sign of − (1 + φy) + [1 − k (1− θ)] (1 + ζ) (see also (2.19) and (2.21)) .




62At least, I have failed to find other linear equilibria for rule 1 .
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is substantially higher for forward-looking rules than for contemporaneously-
looking ones, for the parametrization in Table 2.1 .
I initially consider the baseline equilibrium in which the consumer’s
expectations have no role.63 This corresponds to setting κ5 = 0 in (2.34) .
Observe in (2.36) that the weight of output placed on producer’s expectations
is ξ3 =
φpi
φpi + ζ (φpi−1) , whereas the weight placed on productivity is 1 − ξ3 . The
former decreases in φpi (see also fn. 49) ; the greater φpi , the weaker the indirect
(price) channel of expectations will be. In the limit as φpi → ∞ , prices are
constant. As in the previous case, only the indirect channel of expectations is
muted, therefore inflation stabilization is suboptimal.
The focus so far has been on active policies, which correspond to the
monetary authority setting φpi > 1 . However, setting φpi = 0 in (2.36) and
(2.37) returns yt = at and pt = − at ; a Friedman-rule policy completely
eliminates the role of expectations and keeps the economy at its complete
information level. To provide an intuition for this, observe that for φpi <
1
1+ζ
the price effect becomes negative, which implies the indirect channel effect
mitigates the direct one. For φpi = 0, the two effects precisely offset each
other, rendering, therefore, incomplete information irrelevant in equilibrium.
Notably, such a policy implies that the producer’s revenue is constant across
states: high prices prevail for low productivities and vice versa. Summarizing
the above, the Friedman rule, for different from the usual reasons, emerges as
an optimal policy; however, if an active policy is to be pursued, then it should
be as aggressive on inflation as possible.
Next, I analyze monetary policy when the monetary authority has su-
perior information. As we saw earlier, the monetary authority can either, un-
63See fn. 66 below for the general case.
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intentionally, report prices with a measurement error or, intentionally, fuel the
economy with “surprise” monetary policy shocks. A straightforward option for
a “benevolent” monetary authority in the latter case is to use monetary policy
shocks to eliminate the producer’s expectational errors. However, I will fo-
cus on the monetary policy parameters that can insulate the economy against
measurement errors and can serve as a commitment device against monetary
policy shocks.
One can see from (2.69) and (2.71) and Appendix 2.8.4 that the mon-
etary policy parameter φpi affects the equilibrium not only directly, but also
indirectly by affecting the precision of the endogenous public signal, zt or zˆt ,
it generates. The precision of the public signal is inversely related to δ (δˆ for
the monetary policy shock) .
Considering the case where the authority reports prices with a mea-
surement error, in the limit as φpi → ∞ , the precision of the endogenous
public signal zt becomes zero and δ → 1 ; hence, agents ignore the public
signal which then has no real effects. Alternatively, a Friedman-rule policy en-
sures immunity to measurement errors as well, for the reasons outlined above.
Hence, both extreme policies imply measurement errors have no real effects.
In the case of monetary policy shocks, φpi matters only through the
parameter δˆ as we can see from (2.71) . Appendix 2.8.4 shows that the variance
of the signal zˆt tends to infinity only when a Friedman-rule policy is pursued,
which is the unique optimal policy in this case allowing the monetary authority
to commit against “surprise” shocks. Even though, for φpi > 1 (a sufficient
condition), the variance of the signal increases in φpi , in the limit φpi → ∞
the public signal’s variance is still finite, hence δˆ 6= 1 . This implies that a
policy infinitely aggressive on inflation cannot serve as a commitment device
60
against monetary policy shocks.
Optimal monetary policies
In this section I design targets for forward-looking interest-rate rules which
restore the complete information equilibrium for any choice of policy param-
eters (φpi , φy) . I start with the baseline case of rule 2 and subsequently deal
with the general form that equilibria can have when a forward-looking policy
is followed, given by (2.30) - (2.33) .
Baseline equilibrium. I will follow a reverse engineering process. The op-
timal policy suggested above requires setting φpi = 0 . It is straightforward to
check that this implies yt = at and pt = −at (see also fn. 66 below) .
Consider the rule
it = − log β + φpi Emt [pit+1 − pˆit+1] + φy Emt ∆[yt+1 − yˆt+1] , (2.76)
where the target levels of prices and output are set equal to their above spec-
ified levels: pˆit+1 = −Emt [∆at+1] and yˆt = at . This rule involves the mone-
tary authority “punishing” deviations from the efficient inflation and growth
rates.64,65
Taking the same steps as in the derivations of (2.36) - (2.37) shows that
any chosen coefficients (φpi , φy) can drive the economy to its efficient level.
The Friedman rule is a special case obtained for φpi = φy = 0 .
64 As already emphasized, the authority has complete information when it sets the nominal
interest rate.
65Orphanides (2003) discusses the benefits of targeting output growth.
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κ7 = − [1 + φpi − 1
φpi
k (1− θ)κ5] . (2.78)
This rule drives the economy to its complete information counterpart. Once
again, observe that the inflation and growth targets are related to their com-
plete information levels.66 The proposed rule is invariant to changes in φy ,
whereas, as (2.78) shows, it adjusts to the chosen value of φpi .
67 To get an
intuition for the latter, first use the former result and set φy = 0 in order to
bring the equilibrium closer to the equilibrium given by (2.34) - (2.35) . Then
observe in (2.34) that the real effects of the consumer’s expectations depend
on the monetary authority’s response to expected inflation, φpi . Hence, the
targets in the suggested policy (2.76) - (2.78) also need to adjust accordingly
66 To get an intuition for this, recall that the efficient equilibrium requires ξ3 = 0 ; this
implies κ4 = 0 by (2.32) and κ6 =
1
φpi−1 by (2.33) . Given these, we can see in (2.34) that
ξ3 = 0 prevails for φpi such that κ5 = − 1k (1−θ) φpiφpi−1 . Then, the equilibrium is
yt = at (2.79)
pt =
1




φpi − 1 E
c
t [xt] . (2.80)
The rule given by (2.76) - (2.78) and yˆt = at yields
yt = at (2.81)
pt = − [1 + k (1− θ)κ5] at + κ5Ect [xt] . (2.82)
Setting φpi such that κ5 = − 1k (1−θ) φpiφpi−1 returns (2.79) - (2.80) .
67The rule will not adjust to changes in φpi for κ5 = 0 , as already shown.
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to changes in φpi . All derivations are collected in Appendix 2.8.5 .
The monetary authority can extract the role of the consumer’s expecta-
tions, parametrized by κ5 , and productivity at by observing output and prices
(see also (2.35)) when it steps in; subsequently, it can invoke the rule given by
(2.76) - (2.78) and yˆt = at and restore the complete information equilibrium
for any choice of policy parameters (φpi , φy) .
Last, observe that setting κ5 = 0 returns κ6 = −1 and κ7 = −1 ,
which correspond to the baseline rule (2.76) .
2.7 Conclusion
This essay has reconsidered the nature of purely expectational shocks within
a competitive, cashless, monetary economy. Asymmetric information about
current fundamentals is the driving force in the model. Informational asym-
metries lead agents to form heterogeneous expectations about inflation; as a
result, monetary policy and consumers’ expectations have real effects through
inflation. Traditionally, expectational shocks are viewed as Keynesian demand
shocks: when positive, they increase output, employment and inflation. I have
shown that this interpretation remains a possibility but is not the only one;
expectational shocks can cause business cycle patterns associated with supply
shocks: when positive, they increase output and employment and they lower
inflation. Such an interpretation seems in line with the low inflation and the
high cyclical employment in the mid-80s and the second half of the 90s, which
are recalled as periods of exuberant optimism. Whether expectational shocks
manifest themselves as demand or supply shocks reflects the monetary policy
pursued.
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I have considered different interest-rate rules and shown that forward-
looking rules generate multiple equilibria in which consumers’ expectations
have an arbitrary role. Further to this, expectational shocks cause substan-
tially higher short-run output volatility under forward-looking policies than
under “contemporaneous” ones. Inflation stabilization per se is typically sub-
optimal, as it can at best eliminate uncertainty arising through prices. Op-
timal monetary policies manipulate inflation so that the producer correctly
anticipates his revenue. In this way, producers’ incomplete information about
productivity becomes irrelevant. I have designed targets for forward-looking
interest-rate rules which restore the complete information equilibrium for any
chosen policy parameters.
Recovering purely expectational shocks from the data will shed light on
their seemingly shifting nature. Of course, the literature on the identification
of expectational shocks remains far from settled (for example, Beaudry and
Portier (2006), Blanchard et al. (2009) and Barsky and Sims (2011a,b)). On
the policy front, introducing capital, investment and credit constraints is a
rather natural extension with potentially promising monetary policy implica-
tions.
2.8 Appendix: Omitted Derivations
2.8.1 Log-linear approximations
First, with the exception of the Lagrange multiplier λ , letX denote the steady-
state value of Xt , xt denote logXt , and xˆt denote log
Xt
X
. In the case of log λt
λ
,
I will use λˆt .
64
Starting with (2.8) , note that at the steady state it implies that W =
P A .
















Simplifying and rewriting (2.83) using natural logarithms results in
Ept [e
λˆt + wˆt ] = Ept [e
λˆt + pˆt + aˆt ] . (2.84)
Taking a first-order approximation around the steady state of both sides of
(2.84) (see also Appendix A in Campbell (1994) for a similar exercise) results
in
Ept [1 + λˆt + wˆt] = E
p
t [1 + λˆt + pˆt + aˆt] . (2.85)
Simplifying (2.85) by taking into account that W = P A and yields (2.11) .
For (2.10) one can check Chapter 3 in Gali (2008) .
2.8.2 Kalman filter
Let me start with the consumer’s case which is easier to handle. Suppose that
the consumer’s prior for period-t permanent productivity, xt , is
xt | Ict−1 ∼ N(xt|t−1 , σ2x,t−1) ,
where σ2x,t−1 ≡ V arct−1 [xt] .
Upon the arrival of new information, {st, at} , the consumer’s informa-
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tion set becomes Ict = I
c
t−1 ∪ {st, at} . Taking into account that all shocks
are serially uncorrelated, mutually independent, and normally distributed and
using Bayes’ Law implies that the consumer’s posterior distribution is
xt | Ict ∼ N
(






























. The former denotes the Kalman
gain term, that is the precision of new information, {st, at} , relative to the
total precision of the consumer’s information; the latter denotes the precision
of the signal st relative to that of the consumer’s new information.
Letting σ2x,t ≡ V arct [xt+1] , the following period’s prior is

















+ σ2 . (2.86)
Let σ2x denote the solution (a fixed point) to the Riccati equation (2.86)
(simply set σ2x ≡ σ2x,t−1 = σ2x,t) . A solution does not exist in the limit case
where σ2e → ∞ and σ2u → ∞ which I therefore dismiss.
I assume that both agents’ prior in period 0 is x0 | −1 ∼ N(0 , σ2x) ,
which implies that their learning problems (see below for the producer) are at
their steady state when time commences. As a result, the Kalman gain term
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Turning to the producer’s learning problem, recall from the main text
analysis that, by the end of each period, both agents have received the same
new information. Given their (assumed to be) common prior in period 0 , this
implies that, at the end of each period, Ipt−1,2 = I
c
t−1 . As a result, agents have
the same prior distribution over the following period’s x . That is
xt | Ipt−1,2 ∼ N(xt|t−1 , σ2x,t−1) ,
where σ2x,t−1 ≡ V arct−1 [xt] = V arpt−1,2 [xt] .
Using (2.5) , the producer’s prior distribution of period-t productivity,
at , is
at | Ipt−1,2 ∼ N
(





The consumer and the producer’s information sets differ though in stage




xt | Ipt,1 ∼ N
(

















Along the same lines, the producer’s stage-1 distribution of at is
at | Ipt,1 ∼ N
(












In stage 2 of t , the producer extracts at . Since the producer and the
consumer have the same information, the producer’s stage-2 distribution of xt
coincides with that of the consumer and is given by
xt | Ipt,2 ∼ N
(































Let σ2x,t ≡ V arct [xt+1] = V arpt,2 [xt+1] . The producer’s prior distribu-
tions for xt+1 and at+1 , respectively, are




at+1 | Ipt,2 ∼ N
(


















Observe that the last expression is the same as the Riccati equation
(2.86) . Letting σ2x denote its solution and assuming that the agents’ prior in
period 0 is x0 | −1 ∼ N(0 , σ2x) , implies that the producer’s learning problem is
also at its steady state when time commences. As a result, the Kalman gain
term in (2.16) is time invariant -see above for this . This is also the case for










Last, as long as σ2x solves (2.86) , the variance of the producer’s (prior
or posterior) distribution for at is also time invariant. To see this in the case of
the producer’s prior distribution, juxtapose (2.87) and (2.89) . In the case of
the producer’s posterior (stage-1) distribution, observe that the only possibly
time-varying term in (2.88) is the prior’s variance; if this is time invariant, so
is the variance of the producer’s posterior.
A thorough demonstration of the Kalman filter can be found in An-
derson and Moore (1979) , Harvey (1989) , and Technical Appendix B in
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004) .
2.8.3 Equilibrium under Rule 1
Let me elaborate first on the filtering problems of the agents. The producer’s
and the consumer’s expectations, respectively, are (see also (2.15) and (2.16)) :
Ept [at] = E
p
t,1 [xt] = (1− µ)Ept−1,2 [xt−1] + µ st
Ept,2 [xt] = E
c
t [xt] = (1− k)Ect−1 [xt−1] + k [θ st + (1− θ) at] .
Then, the consumer’s expectations in period t of the producer’s expectations
in t+ 1 are given by
Ect [E
p




and the producer’s expectations in period t of the consumer’s expectations in
t are given by
Ept [E
c
t [xt] ] = (1−k)Ect−1 [xt−1] + k [θ st + (1−θ)Ept [at]] = Ect [xt] + k (1−θ) (Ept [at]− at) .
(2.91)
Substituting conjectures (C1), (C2), and (2.91) in (2.17) implies
ζnt = (1 + κ3 − ξ1)Ept [at] + κ2 k (1−θ) (Ept [at] − at) − (κ3 + ξ2) at . (2.92)
Substituting (2.92) in the firm’s technology, yt = at + nt , using market
clearing, yt = ct , and, subsequently, matching coefficients with conjecture
(C1) yields
ξ1 =








ξ1 + ξ2 = 1 , (2.95)
a direct consequence of preferences logarithmic in consumption.
Turning to the Euler equation (2.18), conjectures (C1) and (C2) com-
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bined with (2.90) imply
Ect [ct+1] − ct = − ξ1Ept [at] + (ξ1 + ξ2)Ect [xt] − ξ2 at (2.96)
it − Ect [pit+1] = (φy ξ1 + φpi κ1)Ept [at] + [−κ1 + (φpi − 1)κ2 − κ3]Ect [xt] +
+ [φy ξ2 + φpi κ3 − φy] at . (2.97)
Matching coefficients in (2.96) and (2.97) yields
− ξ1 =φy ξ1 + φpi κ1 (2.98)
ξ1 + ξ2 = − κ1 + (φpi − 1)κ2 − κ3 (2.99)
− ξ2 =φy ξ2 + φpi κ3 − φy . (2.100)
Summing (2.98) - (2.100) across sides and using (2.95) yields
κ1 + κ2 + κ3 = 0 , (2.101)
whereas summing across (2.98) and (2.100) and again using (2.95) yields
κ1 + κ3 = − 1
φpi
, (2.102)
which are equations (2.23) and (2.24) , respectively, in the main text.
Solving (2.94), (2.95) and (2.98) - (2.100) for ξ1 , ξ2 , κ1 , κ2 , κ3 returns
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(2.19) - (2.21) in the main text.
2.8.4 Equilibria under Rule 2
Equations (2.30) - (2.31) can be obtained by combining the equilibrium labor
decision (2.14) with the firm’s technology and market clearing. They coincide
with (2.93) - (2.95), derived in Appendix 2.8.3 above (one only needs to replace
ξ1 with ξ3 , ξ2 with ξ4 , κ1 with κ4 , κ2 with κ5 , and κ3 with κ6) .
Turning to the Euler equation, conjectures (C3) - (C4) imply Ect [ct+1] =
(ξ3 + ξ4)E
c
t [xt] and E
c
t [pt+1] = (κ4 + κ5 + κ6)E
c
t [xt]. Then the LHS and
the RHS of the Euler equation (2.13) after taking into account that Imt = I
c
t
(equation (2.29) in the main text) become, respectively,
Ect [ct+1] − ct = (ξ3 + ξ4)Ect [xt] − ξ3Ept [at] − ξ4 at (2.103)
it − Ect [pit+1] = (φpi − 1)Ect [pit+1] = (φpi − 1) [(κ4 + κ6)Ect [xt] − κ4Ept [at] − κ6 at] .
(2.104)
Matching coefficients in (2.103) - (2.104) and using (2.31) yields (2.32) - (2.33) .
Omitted derivations in Section 2.5.5
First, I deal with the case in which the monetary authority reports the follow-
ing period’s prices with a measurement error. Next, I follow the same process
in the case of a monetary policy shock. Recall that what distinguishes the two
cases is the information set of the monetary authority.
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Measurement error. Suppose at the end of period t−1 the nominal interest
rate serves as a noisy signal about the price in t, as in (2.62) . Agents extract
p˜t = pt + wt , (2.105)
where p˜t ≡ it−1 +φpi pt−1φpi . The monetary authority’s information set is Imt−1 =
Ωt \ {zt} , where zt is the public signal about period-t productivity which I
derive below and Ωt denotes the state of the economy in t . The latter is
Ωt = ({aτ}tτ=0 , {sτ}tτ=0 , zt) . Using (2.37), (2.105) becomes






where κ4, κ6 are coefficients given by (2.30) - (2.33) for κ5 = 0 . The producer’s
information set in stage 1 is Ipt,1 = Ωt \ {at} . The LHS in (2.106) is the
endogenous public signal in stage 1 of t denoted by zt . It follows then that
zt ≡
[φpi + ζ (φpi − 1)] p˜t − φpiφpi−1 E
p
t [at | Ipt,1 \ {zt}]
ζ
= at +




The conditional variance of productivity is then σ2z ≡ V ar [at | zt] =
(




Turning back to the producer, suppose for a moment that zt is not part
of his information set. Then, the producer’s posterior distribution of at is



















xt | Ipt,1 \ {zt}
]
is given by (2.15) and σ2x is the fixed point in (2.86) .
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Taking zt into account, the producer’s posterior becomes




xt | Ipt,1 \ {zt}
]



























Monetary policy shock. In case the monetary authority transmits mone-
tary policy shocks, its information set additionally includes zˆt , that is I
m
t−1 =
Ωˆt . Taking the same steps as before, agents observe pˆt = φpi pt + ωt , where
pˆt ≡ it−1 + φpi pt−1 . The monetary authority transmits the public signal
zˆt = at +





[φpi + ζ(φpi − 1)] pˆt − φ2piφpi−1 E
p
t [at | Ipt,1]
φpi ζ
. (2.109)






The producer’s posterior is




xt | Ipt,1 \ {zˆt}
]



























Observe that unlike in (2.107) , the producer’s expectations in (2.109)
are conditional on the entire information set of the producer. To fully extract
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zˆt use (2.110) to get
zˆt ≡ [φpi (1−δˆ) + ζ(φpi−1)]−1
{
(φpi − 1) [φpi + ζ(φpi − 1)]
φpi
pˆt − φpi δˆ Ept
[
xt | Ipt,1 \ {zˆt}
]}
.
2.8.5 Derivations in Section 2.6.2
Consider the interest-rate rule
it = − log β + φpi Emt [pit+1 − pˆit+1] + φy Emt ∆[yt+1 − yˆt+1] ,
where pˆit+1 = κ7E
m
t (at+1 − at) and yˆt = at . A reverse engineering process
will pin down κ7 .
The labor market optimality condition implies
ξ3 =
1 + κ6 + k (1− θ)κ5
1 + ζ
ξ4 = 1 − ξ3 ,
which correspond to equations (2.30) - (2.31) in the main text. Taking familiar
steps, the Euler equation implies
1− φy = (φpi − 1) (κ4 + κ6) − φpi κ7 − φy (2.111)
(1− φy) ξ3 = (φpi − 1)κ4 (2.112)




(φpi − 1)κ6 − 1
φpi
(2.114)
implies ξ3 = 0 and ξ4 = 1 as required, κ4 = 0 and κ6 = − [1 + k (1−θ)κ5] .
Combining the latter with (2.114) yields (2.78) in text.
2.9 Appendix: Data
Data in Figures 2.1 - 2.4 are collected from the St. Louis Fed and refer to the
US economy for the period 1965 : 1 - 2010 : 1 . Data in Figures 2.1 and 2.3 are
quarterly, whereas in Figures 2.2 and 2.4 they are annual. Employment refers
to “All Employees: Total Nonfarm Employees (Thousands of Persons)” (series
PAYEMS) and is seasonally adjusted. It is logged and HP-filtered with penalty
1600 for quarterly and 100 for annual data, respectively. Figures 2.1 - 2.4 show
its cyclical component scaled up by 50 for expositional clarity. Inflation in
Figures 2.1 and 2.3 refers to percent changes in the “Gross Domestic Product:
Implicit Price Deflator” (series GDPDEF) and is seasonally adjusted. Inflation
in Figures 2.2 and 2.4 refers to percent changes in the “Consumer Price Index
for All Urban Consumers: All Items” (series CPIAUCSL) and is seasonally
adjusted. Consumer Sentiment refers to “University of Michigan: Consumer
Sentiment” (series UMCSENT1, UMCSENT) and is not seasonally adjusted.
It is scaled down by 25 in Figure 2.3 and by 10 in Figure 2.4 .68
68In the figures, GDP is an abbreviation for Gross Domestic Product and CPI is an
abbreviation for Consumer Price Index.
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2.10 Appendix: Solving for the Equilibrium
under Rule 1 Without Approximations
Plug the producer’s labor demand condition, (2.8) , into the consumer’s labor


















Turning to the Euler equation, (2.10) , suppose that the monetary au-
thority sets the nominal bond price according to the following interest-rate
rule:








where Πt ≡ PtPt−1 .














Let me now post the following conjectures for log-consumption and log-
inflation:
ct = ξ0 + ξ1E
p
t [at] + ξ2 at (C1’)
pit = κ0 + κ1E
p
t [at] + κ2E
c
t [xt] + κ3 at . (C2’)
Given that all shocks are normally distributed, I will show below that,
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conditional on the agents’ information sets, conjectures (C1’) and (C2’) imply
that Ct and Πt are log-normally distributed.
Let me start with the labor optimality condition, (2.115) . Take tech-
nology (yt = at + nt) into account to express it as follows:




− (pit + ct)]
. (2.117)
Next, use market clearing and rearrange terms in (2.117) to get




− (pit + ct)]
. (2.118)
Take conjectures (C1’) and (C2’) into account and express the LHS of
(2.118) as
e(1+ζ) ξ0 +κ0 + [(1+ζ) ξ1 +κ1]E
p
t [at] +κ2 E
c
t [xt] + [(1+ζ) ξ2− ζ+κ3] at . (2.119)
The RHS of (2.118) is equal to
Ept [e
− ξ0− ξ1 Ept [at] + (1− ξ2) at ]
Ept [e
−{κ0 + ξ0 + (κ1 + ξ1)Ept [at] +κ2 Ect [xt] + (κ3 + ξ2) at}]
. (2.120)
Conditional on the producer’s information set, Ipt,1 = Ψt \ {at} , the
exponent in the nominator of (2.120) is normally distributed with mean − ξ0 +






+ σ2u and σ
2
x solves the Riccati equation (2.86) (see also the
analysis in 2.8.2) . Then, the nominator of (2.120) is equal to





(1− ξ2)2 σ2p,a (2.121)
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Let me now turn to the exponent in the denominator of (2.118) . It is
also normally distributed with mean
Ept [− (pit + ct)] =
− {κ0 + ξ0 + [κ1 + κ2 k (1− θ) + κ3 + ξ1 + ξ2]Ept [at] + κ2Ect [xt] − κ2 k (1− θ) at} ,
where I have used (2.91) .
To find its variance, V arpt [− (pit + ct)] , first bring pit + ct into the following
form:
pit + ct = κ0 + ξ0 + (κ1 + ξ1)E
p
t [at] +κ2 [(1−k)Ect−1[xt−1] + k θ st] + [κ2 k (1−θ) +κ3 + ξ2] at .
It then follows that
V arpt [− (pit + ct)] = [κ2 k (1− θ) + κ3 + ξ2]2 σ2p,a .
The denominator on the RHS of (2.120) is then equal to
Ept [e
− (pit + ct)] = e−{κ0 + ξ0 + [κ1 +κ2 k (1−θ) +κ3 + ξ1 + ξ2]E
p
t [at] +κ2 E
c
t [xt]−κ2 k (1−θ) at}×
× e 12 [κ2 k (1−θ) +κ3 + ξ2]2 σ2p,a . (2.122)






{(1−ξ2)2− [κ2 k (1−θ) +κ3 + ξ2]2}σ2p,a + [1 +κ1 +κ2 k (1−θ) +κ3]Ept [at] +κ2 Ect [xt]−κ2 k (1−θ) at .
(2.123)
Matching coefficients in (2.119) and (2.123) yields (2.93) , (2.94) , and
ξ0 =
1
2 (1 + ζ)
{(1− ξ2)2 − [κ2 k (1− θ) + κ3 + ξ2]2}σ2p,a . (2.124)
Turning to the Euler equation, (2.116) , it can be expressed as follows:
e− [φpi pit +φy (yt−at)] = ect Ect [e
− (ct+1 +pit+1)] . (2.125)
Let me start with the LHS of (2.125) . Market clearing and conjectures
(C1’) and (C2’) imply that it can be expressed as
e− [φpi pit +φy (yt− at)] = e−{φpi κ0 +φy ξ0 + (φpi κ1 +φy ξ1)E
p
t [at] +φpi κ2 E
c
t [xt] + [φpi κ3 +φy (ξ2− 1)] at} .
(2.126)
Turning to the RHS of (2.125) , ct+1 + pit+1 conditional on the con-
sumer’s information set Ict = Ψt is normally distributed with mean
Ect [ct+1 + pit+1] = ξ0 + κ0 + (ξ1 + ξ2 + κ1 + κ2 + κ3)E
c
t [xt] ,
where once again I have used conjectures (C1’) - (C2’) .
80
To find the variance, V arct+1 [ct+1 + pit+1] , express, first, ct+1 + pit+1 as
ct+1 + pit+1 =
= ξ0 + κ0 + [(ξ1 + κ1)(1− µ) + κ2(1− k)]Ect [xt] + [(ξ1 + κ1)µ+ κ2kθ] st+1+
+ [ξ2 + κ3 + κ2 k(1− θ)] at+1
= G + [(ξ1 + κ1)µ + κ2 k + ξ2 + κ3]xt+1 + [(ξ1 + κ1)µ + κ2 k θ] et+1
+ [ξ2 + κ3 + κ2 k (1− θ)]ut+1 ,
where G ≡ ξ0 + κ0 + [(ξ1 + κ1) (1− µ) + κ2 (1− k)]Ect [xt] is a known term
to the consumer in period t . Given that shocks are mutually independent, it
follows that
V arct+1 [ct+1 + pit+1] = [(ξ1 + κ1)µ + κ2 k + ξ2 + κ3]
2 σ2x + [(ξ1 + κ1)µ + κ2 k θ]
2 σ2e +
+ [ξ2 + κ3 + κ2 k (1− θ)]2 σ2u .
Hence,
Ect [e
− (ct+1 +pit+1)] = e− [ ξ0 +κ0 + (ξ1 + ξ2 +κ1 +κ2 +κ3)E
c
t [xt] ]×
× e 12 {[(ξ1 +κ1)µ+κ2 k + ξ2 +κ3]2 σ2x + [(ξ1 +κ1)µ+κ2 k θ]2 σ2e + [ξ2 +κ3 +κ2 k (1−θ)]2 σ2u} .
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Consequently, the RHS of (2.125) becomes
ect Ect [e
− (ct+1 +pit+1)] = e−κ0+
1
2
{[(ξ1+κ1)µ+κ2k+ξ2+κ3]2 σ2x+[(ξ1+κ1)µ+κ2kθ]2 σ2e+[ξ2+κ3+κ2k(1−θ)]2 σ2u}×
× eξ1 Ept [at]− (ξ1 + ξ2 +κ1 +κ2 +κ3)Ect [xt] + ξ2 at . (2.127)
Matching coefficients in (2.126) and (2.127) yields (2.98) - (2.100) and
κ0 = − φy ξ0




{[(ξ1 + κ1)µ+ κ2k + ξ2 + κ3]2 σ2x + [(ξ1 + κ1)µ+ κ2kθ]2 σ2e + [ξ2 + κ3 + κ2k(1− θ)]2 σ2u}
φpi−1
,
where ξ0 is given by (2.124) and ξ1 , ξ2 , κ1 , κ2 , κ3 solve (2.94), (2.95) and
(2.98) - (2.100) (see also the analysis in 2.8.3) .
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Figure 2.1: Changes in GDP Deflator and Cyclical Employment: 1965 - 2010
(quarterly)


















Figure 2.2: CPI Inflation and Cyclical Employment: 1965 - 2010 (annual)
















Figure 2.3: Changes in GDP Deflator, Cyclical Employment and Consumer
Sentiment: 1965 - 2010 (quarterly)
















Figure 2.4: CPI Inflation, Cyclical Employment and Consumer Sentiment:
1965 - 2010 (annual)

















Figure 2.5: Impulse responses to a positive expectational shock for rule 1 with
φy = 0.5
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Figure 2.6: Impulse responses to a positive permanent productivity shock for
rule 1 with φy = 0.5
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Figure 2.7: Impulse responses to a positive temporary productivity shock for
rule 1 with φy = 0.5
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Figure 2.8: Impulse responses to a positive expectational shock for rule 1 with
φy = 0
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Figure 2.9: Impulse responses to a positive permanent productivity shock for
rule 1 with φy = 0
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Figure 2.10: Impulse responses to a positive temporary productivity shock for
rule 1 with φy = 0
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Figure 2.11: Impulse responses to a positive expectational shock for baseline
rule 2 (1)
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Figure 2.12: Impulse responses to a positive expectational shock for baseline
rule 2 (2)
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Figure 2.13: Impulse responses to a positive permanent productivity shock for
baseline rule 2 (1)
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Figure 2.14: Impulse responses to a positive permanent productivity shock for
baseline rule 2 (2)
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Figure 2.15: Impulse responses to a positive temporary productivity shock for
baseline rule 2 (1)
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Figure 2.16: Impulse responses to a positive temporary productivity shock for
baseline rule 2 (2)
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Technological Change and the
Length of Patents
3.1 Introduction
When it comes to the release of new products, companies, especially technol-
ogy ones, are particularly concerned about two things: its timing and being
secretive. The latter suggests that potential gains are short-lived; the former
suggests that timing affects them.
This essay attempts to address three questions, related to the above
remarks. First, can companies coordinate the launch of new (improved) prod-
ucts even though they may develop them time-separately in the presence of
capital (or any storable commodity) and the absence of borrowing constraints?
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Second, can regulators affect this possibility by extending rights over improved
technologies? And if so, will this necessarily lead to welfare improvements?
Yes, yes, and perhaps.
A natural starting point in this attempt is Shleifer (1986) which in-
troduced “implementation cycles.” However, it did so in an economy where
storable commodities are absent and argued that their absence is indeed in-
dispensable.1 This essay builds on it, allows for capital and savings and shows
that, in sharp contrast with Shleifer’s conjecture, implementation cycles are
still possible.
More analytically, the economy consists of a representative agent who
consumes a final good produced by a respective firm which he owns and to
which he supplies his labor. The final-good firm is competitive and, besides
labor, uses two different types of capital. For each type of capital, there is a
respective sector comprising a number of Bertrand-competing capital makers.
Capital makers use foregone consumption (investment) to produce the capital
good they specialize in.
Suppose that in odd-numbered periods, a patent reaches randomly a
firm (capital maker) in sector 1 and, in the even-numbered ones, a firm in
sector 2 . Patents are on cost-reducing technologies which imply that a unit of
capital requires less resources in order to be produced. Initially, as in Shleifer
(1986) , I let firms make profits out of a patent only for one period; once a
patent is utilized, the innovating firms’ competitors costlessly copy the idea
the patent was on and drive sector profits to zero -until a new patent arrives
to the sector. As competitors cannot reverse-engineer an idea a patent is on
before it is actually implemented, I will henceforth use the terms patent and
1See (Shleifer, 1986, page 1183) .
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idea interchangeably.
Firms need to decide when they will implement their patents. I show
that, if they share expectations about future and have perfect foresight, multi-
ple “sunspot” equilibria can arise: firms can either implement their patents as
soon as they receive them, which implies that patents are in place at the same
-perfectly smooth- rate as that of their arrival, or they may instead coordinate
their implementation, in which case “implementation cycles” with capital are
generated.
To see this, note that imperfect competition invites demand external-
ities among capital-good sectors. Since a capital maker can postpone im-
plementation of a patent, for instance, to the following period, when with
certainty no improved technology will arrive, it needs to decide whether to
implement it immediately or in the following period. As Matsuyama (1995)
notes, it is precisely the intertemporal decision that firms face in combination
with the presence of intratemporal demand externalities that can result in
multiple equilibria which can be Pareto-ranked.
Nevertheless, and despite this intuition, implementation cycles in the
presence of capital and the absence of borrowing constraints (or constrained
investment volatility) is something that Shleifer (1986) conjectured against:
anticipating future profits, agents would attempt to reduce their current sav-
ings in order to smooth out consumption. In turn, that would lower production
and hence profits in a hypothetical implementation boom. For consumption
smoothing to be mitigated, higher real interest rates would be necessary, which
would in turn imply that firms discount future profits more. Both effects could
rule out implementation cycles.
Why is this not so here? The reason is that patents are on investment-
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specific technological change, in the spirit of Greenwood et al. (1997, 2000) .
Investment-specific technological change introduces a one-period discrepancy
between the consumption boom and the wealth boom. To see this, note that
the implementation of a patent in the technology of a capital good reduces
its current production cost, whereas the revenue out of it becomes realized
in the following period. The latter implies that the wealth boom occurs one
period after the coordinated implementation of patents takes place. The for-
mer implies that investment is substantially reduced in the implementation
periods -in fact, it can even undershoot- and drives consumption above trend.
As a result, the interest rate paid then is higher than the interest rate paid
in the following, “wealth-boom,” period. This increases investment in imple-
mentation booms, smoothing out consumption in the opposite direction from
the conjectured one -without overturning the result on consumption which is
a general equilibrium one-, and implies that more capital is installed in the
following period which, given the elastic demand for it, leads to greater profits.
Taking all into account, discounted profits after a conjectured coordinated im-
plementation of patents become greater and, therefore, implementation cycles
with capital possible.
In a policy extension, I let firms appropriate a patent for two periods.
It turns out that implementation cycles become impossible. To see this, note
that, in that case, postponing implementation to the following period is equiva-
lent to postponing implementation to two periods afterwards in the one-period
monopoly case. In a stationary equilibrium, every other period is the same.
As a result, as long as firms discount future at a positive rate, which turns out
to be always the case, the possibility of implementation cycles is ruled out.
A natural question is whether the immediate implementation of patents
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when patent rights last two periods is welfare-improving over the equilibria
that can prevail when they last one period. Relative to the immediate imple-
mentation equilibrium of the latter case the answer is negative: patents diffuse
faster to the implementing firms’ competitors which implies that the economy
reaches a certain consumption level faster. Nevertheless, relative to the cyclical
equilibrium the answer can be positive. There are three effects which push in
opposite directions. First is the one already described: patents (only of sector
2 though) diffuse faster in the cyclical equilibrium. Second, in the “two-period-
patent” equilibrium, sector-1 patents are implemented one period ahead. Both
effects result in lower investment -that is less resources to be directed towards
the following period’s capital- in the immediate implementation, two-period-
patent equilibrium. Nevertheless, general equilibrium effects favor output in
the “one-period-patent,” synchronized implementation equilibrium. It turns
out that for patents being on not too drastic (cost-reducing) ideas, the “invest-
ment” effects outweigh the “output” effect, rendering, thereby, a prolongation
of patent rights potentially desirable.
Related literature. The closest paper to this essay is Shleifer (1986) , the
main differences with which I highlighted above. In the remaining parts of the
essay, I frequently refer to how the two relate to each other in greater detail.2,3
2A simplified version of Shleifer (1986) which could serve as an intermediate step be-
tween Shleifer’s model and mine can be found on Lawrence Christiano’s teaching web-
page. The link to this is http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~lchrist/d11/d1101/
implement.pdf .
3With expectations arbitrarily supporting one of the possible multiple equilibria, this
essay relates to the “sunspots” literature, which, includes, among other articles, Azariadis
(1981) , Cass and Shell (1983) and Grandmont (1985) . Benhabib and Farmer (1999) offers an
overview of this literature. A complementary earlier survey with an emphasis on endogenous
cycles can be found in Boldrin and Woodford (1990) .
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Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2008) also generates implementation cycles
with capital which, further, can be sustained as a unique equilibrium outcome.
Although, their model is quite different from the one in this essay, I will
restrict attention to two key differences. A central assumption the authors
make is that patents arrive after firms have incurred an endogenous search
cost. A consequence of this assumption is that patents arrive simultaneously
in all sectors, which is in sharp contrast with the perfectly smooth rate of
their arrival in Shleifer (1986) and here: if patents arrive in cycles, they are
more easily implemented in cycles as well. A second key difference is that, in
Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2008) , patents do not affect the technology of capital
but they instead affect the technology of intermediate goods which requires
only labor. Consequently, the wealth and the consumption booms coincide.
Here, patents affect the investment technology which naturally introduces a
one-period discrepancy between the consumption and the wealth boom.4
Turning to the literature related to the essay’s result on patent policy,
this essay differs from a recent and growing literature on patent protection and
intellectual property rights which includes, among other articles, Boldrin and
Levine (2002, 2008b) and Henry and Ponce (2011) .5,6 This literature focuses
on the incentives to innovate and analyzes whether markets for patents can
substitute for the absence of patent rights. Here, innovation is exogenous,
whereas allowing for a market for patents would leave the results intact.
4Certainly this essay shares features, which I will not attempt to review here, with
the growth literature, prominent contributions to which include Romer (1990) , Grossman
and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) , the literature on strategic delay (for
instance, Chamley and Gale (1994)) , as well as Matsuyama (1999) and, more recently,
Jovanovic (2009) . Needless to say, this list is by no means exhaustive.
5See also the discussion in Boldrin and Levine (2008a) .
6This literature dates back to Schumpeter (1942) and Arrow (1962) . Chapter 12 in
Acemoglu (2009) offers an excellent overview of the early literature. Holmes and Schmitz
(2010) offers a more general discussion on how competition affects productivity.
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Hopenhayn and Squintani (2010) also considers the effects of patent
rights on the timing of patent releases. However it does so in a model of se-
quential innovation which allows for preemptive entry by an innovating firm’s
competitors. Consequently, the timing of patents balances the possibility of
preemption and the generation of future patents. I abstract from such consid-
erations here: firms can utilize a patent immediately or with delay without the
fear of preemption and without the fear that the implementation of a patent
affects their future generation of patents, which happens independently over
time, randomly and costlessly.
These abstractions allow the essay to concentrate solely on the effects
of patent rights on the implementation -rather than the generation- of patents
and, thereby, offer a clean argument from a different -and, to the best of my
knowledge, new- perspective to the ongoing -and lively- discussion about the
length of patent rights.
The rest of the essay is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the
model. Section 3.3 analyzes the equilibria when patent rights last one period.
Section 3.4 discusses welfare. Section 3.5 extends patent rights to two periods
and performs welfare comparisons with the equilibria which can prevail when
patent rights last one period. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 The Model
The economy is populated by an infinitely-lived (representative) agent. The
agent consumes a single storable commodity (final good) produced by a (rep-
resentative) final-good firm to which he supplies labor. Further, the final-good
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firm uses two storable (composite) capital goods in an additively-separable
way. For each capital good, there is a respective sector which comprises at
least two capital-good firms Bertrand-competing for its production. It takes
one period to produce a capital good and foregone consumption (investment)
is used as input in its production. Capital-good firms become the recipients
of patents on cost-saving ideas (henceforth, simply “patents”) and, once they
implement these, they can make temporary monopoly profits before being im-
itated by their competitors. I elaborate more on this last -and central- feature
of the economy below.
There is no uncertainty; agents and firms share expectations about the
future and have perfect foresight. Agents (firms) can perfectly borrow against
their future profits (revenue) . Time is discrete and infinite and commences in
period 1 .
3.2.1 Representative agent
The preferences of the agent are given by
∞∑
t=1
βt−1 U(xt , lt) (3.1)
with
U(xt , lt) = log xt + χ log lt , (3.2)
where xt denotes consumption of the final good, lt denotes leisure, β ∈ (0, 1)
parametrizes the agent’s time preference, and χ > 0 parametrizes the relative
weight on leisure within the period utility of the agent.7
7The intertemporal elasticity of substitution is 1 . However, the implementation cycles
that I specify below are more easily generated the greater the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution is.
106
The agent is endowed with one unit of time, owns all firms in the econ-
omy and can freely borrow against his perfectly foreseen future profits. This
last assumption is essentially an assumption of perfect capital markets and






mt [wt (1 − lt) + Πft +
2∑
i=1




for t > 1 , with m1 = 1 ; Rt denotes the gross real
interest rate paid in period t + 1 , wt denotes the real wage paid by the final-
good firm, and Πft and Πt,i denote the profits that accrue to the agent by the
final-good firm and capital-good firms in sector i for i = 1, 2 , respectively.
All prices and the real interest rate are expressed in units of the final good.
The agent chooses {(xt , lt)∞t=1} , where xt > 0 and lt ∈ (0, 1] to maxi-
mize his lifetime utility given by (3.1) - (3.2) subject to his intertemporal bud-
get constraint given by (3.3) . The first order conditions with respect to xt
and lt imply the following relations:
xt+1
xt


















The final-good firm is competitive in both the final-good and the input mar-
kets. Its (neoclassical) technology is given by






t,2 ) , (3.8)
where nt denotes employed labor, kt,1 and kt,2 denote capital of types 1 and
2, respectively, rented8 in period t and α ∈ (0, 1) measures the labor share
and the inverse elasticity of substitution between the two types of capital.9
Note that the marginal products of the two capital types are conditionally -on
labor- independent of each other as in Romer (1990) . I assume that capital
depreciates fully within a period.10
In each period t , the final-good firm chooses {nt , kt,1 , kt,2 , yt} (all in
non-negative quantities) to maximize its temporal profits given by
Πft = yt − wt nt − qt,1 kt,1 − qt,2 kt,2 ,
8I assume that final-good firms rent rather than buy capital in order to avoid possible
problems with the final-good firm buying capital in advance in order to use it in the future.
9The technology of the final-good firm can be alternatively expressed as F (nt,Kt) =
nαt K
1−α








α−1 with α =
1
α .
10 Since capital depreciates fully within a period and with demand for it being positive in
equilibrium, it may be pointed out that this is essentially an irreversibility constraint since
it effectively rules out disinvestment. That may be true at face value, nevertheless, at the
same time, it implies that investment has the highest possible volatility as each period the
economy needs new capital to be produced. See also fn. 33 .
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where yt ≤ F (nt , kt,1 , kt,2) with F (·) given by (3.8) ; qt,i denotes the real
rental price of capital type i for i = 1 , 2 . In period 1 , the firm is endowed
with quantities of capital k1,1 and k1,2 , on which I elaborate below and in
Section 3.4.1 .









qt,i = (1− α)nαt k−αt,i , for i = 1 , 2 . (3.10)
Observe that both demand functions are elastic (w,n = − 11−α and q,ki =
− 1
α
, respectively) and that profits are zero in each period, an implication of
constant returns to scale.
3.2.3 Capital-good firms
I consider two types of capital goods.11 For each capital good, there is a number
of capital makers which Bertrand-compete for its production with no capacity
constraints. They are indexed by j and j′ for firms 1 and 2, respectively, where
j = 1 , 2 , . . . , J and j′ = 1 , 2 , . . . , J ′ with J , J ′ ≥ 2 .
11This is an abstraction. In fact, I need two baskets of capital goods with each basket
including a sufficiently high number of capital goods so that each capital-good firm is small
enough within its “basket.” The desired implication of this assumption is that capital-good
firms take aggregate outcomes as given; put differently, any strategic interactions among
firms within and across baskets are ruled out. For simplicity, let each basket contain a
continuum of unit measure of capital goods. That is kt,i =
∫
i′ ∈ [0,1] kt,i,i′ di
′ , where kt,i,i′
denotes capital good i′ in basket i in t . Assuming a symmetric treatment of capital goods
within a composite capital good allows me henceforth, for expositional clarity, to mention
capital-good type i and actually refer to the representative capital good (i, i′) in basket i .
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Capital-good firms operate a constant-returns-to-scale technology. For
instance, the technology of capital maker j manufacturing capital of type 1 is
given by
kt,1,j = ψt−1,1,j it−1,1,j , (3.11)
where kt,1,j denotes capital of type 1 produced by capital maker j in period t
and it−1,1,j denotes capital maker j’s investment, which is foregone consump-
tion, in period t−1 used as input in the production of capital type 1 . Likewise
for capital good of type 2 (see also fn. 10) .








Supposing that, before the economy starts, firms j and j′ in sectors
1 and 2 , respectively, have no inferior technology relative to that of their








where ψ0,1,−j and ψ0,2,−j′ denote the technology level of their competitors before
the economy starts.
Since I focus on the balanced growth path (steady state) of the economy,
I treat time as if had commenced in −∞ . This implies that capital in period
1 summarizes the state of an economy which started in −∞ . Equivalently, an
economy which starts in period 1 must do so with the “right” levels of capital.
I resume this discussion in Section 3.4.1 .
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Pattern of patents
I make two assumptions on the arrival of patents which are as in Shleifer
(1986) .
Assumption 1. Patents on improved technologies arrive exogenously. They
reach sectors sequentially, at a perfectly smooth rate. With no loss of general-
ity, a patent reaches randomly a firm in capital sector 1 in odd periods and a
firm in capital sector 2 in the even ones. Patents are on ideas that affect the




where µ > 1 and ψ·, i, j denotes the state-of-the-art technology (inverse marginal
cost of capital) in sector i possessed by firm j .12 As time commences in pe-
riod 1 , an odd period, imposing ψ0,1,j = 1 and ψ0,2,j′ = µ
1
2 removes the
first-mover advantage of sector 1, thereby ensuring the symmetric treatment
of capital-good sectors: the lead in the technology race alternates between
sectors with their relative technology “distance” remaining fixed at µ
1
2 . Put
differently, it is as if time commenced in −∞ .13
12Observe that the economy encompasses only investment-specific technological change
as in Greenwood et al. (1997) . For expositional reasons, I completely abstract from total
factor productivity (TFP) .
13Although I have not explored this case, presumably the assumption that patents arrive
periodically could be partially relaxed; what really matters is that the probability with
which a patent reaches a particular sector before the indicated time is sufficiently low. The
fact that patents reach the economy at a perfectly smooth rate renders the generation of
cycles harder and crystallizes the forces which underpin them. If patents arrived in a cyclical
fashion, then their cyclical implementation would perhaps come as no surprise. In fact, this
is what underpins the result in Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2008) , in which, though, the timing
of the patent arrival is endogenous.
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Assumption 2. A firm can appropriate an idea a patent is on only for one
period: in the period following its implementation, this idea becomes publicly
disclosed and imitators enter driving prices down to marginal cost and profits
to zero.14
Profits
Profits of capital maker j 15 which produces capital good i are given by
Πt,i,j = qt,i,j kt,i,j − Rt−1 it−1,i,j .
Capital maker j of capital good i chooses {kt,i,j , it−1,i,j} for each t to maximize
its profits subject to the technology given by (3.11) . Since revenue is realized
one period after investment is made, I allow capital-good firms to be able to
perfectly borrow against their future revenue.
Below I distinguish between two cases: in the first case, all firms within
sector i operate the same technology in which case a firm, say j , is randomly
selected to produce capital of type i . In the second case, firm j has a tech-
nological advantage over its competitors which allows it to enjoy monopoly
profits.
14The fact that firms make temporary monopoly profits is an assumption in line with
Shleifer (1986) as well as the Schumpeterian growth literature originating in Aghion and
Howitt (1992) , which also focuses on quality improvements (“process innovations”) ; it is
in contrast with Romer (1990) in which firms’ rights over the use of an idea last forever.
Further, unlike the endogenous growth literature, this essay entirely abstracts from issues
concerning the generation of patents. This will prove useful in Section 3.5 where I extend the
horizon of patent rights to two periods, as it will enable me to focus on the “implementation”
effects of patent rights and to entirely abstract from their effect on the generation of patents,
an issue which the literature traditionally studies.
15With a slight abuse of notation, henceforth I will make no distinction between j and j′ .
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Perfect competition. When ψt,i,j = ψt,i,−j , where ψ·,·,−j denotes the in-
verse marginal cost of the competitors of capital maker j , there is perfect
competition which, given the constant returns to scale, implies zero profits.





Inverse demand for capital from the final-good firm (3.10) pins down the com-








Monopoly in the presence of a competitive fringe. Capital maker j
implementing a patent in the production of capital type i , for instance, in
period t− 1 enjoys monopoly profits in the following period, t , as it takes one
period to build capital. Capital maker j chooses kt,i,j to maximize its profits
given by
Πt,i,j = qt,i,j kt,i,j − Rt−1 kt,i,j
µψt−1,i,−j
, (3.16)
subject to the (inverse) demand for capital given by (3.10) . Since demand for
capital is elastic, the solution is well defined:
qmt,i,j =
Rt−1









Henceforth, I restrict attention to the case in which qmt,i,j ≥ q∗t,i,j . In
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this case, the “limit” price q∗t,i,j is set: a capital maker which implements a
patent cannot charge more than the price its competitors would set, q∗t,i,j , else
its competitors would undercut it and capture the whole market. Limit pricing
takes place (i.e. qmt,i,j ≥ q∗t,i,j ) when
µ (1− α) ≤ 1 . (3.17)
The lower the innovation rate, µ , and the less elastic the demand for capital
is, the more easily (3.17) is satisfied. For a certain level of the elasticity of the
demand for capital, condition (3.17) imposes an upper bound on the innovation
rate. Likewise, for a certain innovation rate, (3.17) imposes an upper bound
on the elasticity of capital demand.16
Then, a monopolist sells a quantity given by (3.15) , which corresponds
to the technology level of its competitors, at the price its competitors would
set, given by (3.14) , and makes profits because of its lower -by µ relative to its
competitors- marginal cost of producing a unit of capital. Combining (3.16)
with (3.14) and (3.15) implies that the monopolist’s profits are given by
















Profits depend negatively on the interest rate paid in the period they are made.
This is because demand for capital is elastic and a higher real interest rate
implies that capital becomes more costly. That the demand for capital is elastic
also explains the increase of profits in the technology level of a monopolist’s
competitors. In addition, profits depend proportionally on contemporaneous
16For α = 2/3 , this implies that µ ≤ 3 . In R&D theory, the complementary case in
which qmt,i,j < q
∗
t,i,j refers to “drastic innovations.” See also Chapter 12 in Acemoglu (2009) .
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employment by virtue of the technology of the final-good firm.
The implementation decision
As I have already argued, the implementation of a patent results in profits in
the following period. In the presence of two capital-good sectors, suppose that
the recipient of a patent needs to decide whether to implement it immediately
or in the following period.
A capital maker j in sector i receiving a patent in, say, period t− 1 will
implement it immediately rather than in the following period as long as its
present discounted period t profits exceed its present discounted t+ 1 profits.
That is (superscripts denote the date a patent arrives and time in subscripts

































capital maker j prefers to postpone implementation to the following period.
Implicit in these is that a capital maker cannot affect the real interest
rate by its actions alone (see also fn. 11) .
Last, note that, even though profits depend on the competitors’ tech-
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nology level at the period of implementation, the implementation decision is
independent of it.
3.3 Balanced Growth Path Equilibria
I restrict attention to perfect-foresight, balanced growth path equilibria which
involve cycles of constant periodicity.
On the balanced growth path (BGP) , consumption, production, and in-
vestment grow all at the same long-run rate. However, since, by construction,
a patent reaches a sector every other period, the growth rate of the economy’s
variables may differ between odd and even periods within a cycle. Consump-







= λ , (3.22)
where τ denotes an even period, with no loss of generality (see also fn. 19) .





if t = τ
λ
v β
if t = τ + 1
. (3.23)
Combining (3.22) with (3.5) leads to the following remark:
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Next, I provide the equilibrium definition:
Definition 2 (BGP Equilibrium). A perfect-foresight (periodic) balanced growth
path equilibrium is a set of interest rates {Rt}∞t=1 and prices {wt , {qt,i}2i=1}∞t=1 ,
an allocation {lt, xt}∞t=1 for the representative agent, an allocation {nt , {kdt,i}2i=1 , yt}∞t=1
for the final-good firm, and an allocation ({kst,i , it,i}∞t=1)i= 1,2 for the technology-
leading firms in the capital-good sectors,17 such that
1. (Optimality) The allocations of the agent, the final-good firm and the
leaders in the capital-good sectors solve their problems, laid out in Section
3.2 , at the stated prices.
2. (Market clearing) kdt,i = k
s
t,i ≡ kt,i for all i , nt + lt = 1 and yt =
xt + it where it = it,1 + it,2 , for all t .
3. (Consistency) For expectations arbitrarily centered around an equilibrium
(“sunspots”) , capital-good firms must find it optimal to implement their
patents as conjectured.
4. (No storage) No storage takes place.
I start with the no-storage condition (requirement (4) in Definition 2) :18
Condition 1 (No storage). Rt > 1 for all t rules out storage in equilibrium.
Proof. See the Appendix.
17kt,i refers to capital produced by sector i . Furthermore, as I have already mentioned,
if all firms within a sector have the same technology level, a capital-good firm is randomly
chosen.
18The storage technology I assume is one-to-one.
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As my focus is on stationary equilibria, I will restrict attention to just
period τ , an even period, and the periods before and after it. Hence, following
the analysis in Section 3.2.3 , in period τ − 1, an odd period, a patent reaches
a firm in sector 1 and the state-of-the-art technology, irrespectively of whether
the patent is implemented or not, becomes µψ , greater by by µ compared to
its assumed previous level ψ , whereas in sector 2 it remains µ1/2 ψ ; in period
τ a patent reaches a firm in sector 2 in which the state-of-the-art technology
becomes µ3/2 ψ , whereas in sector 1 it remains µψ . As I have already pointed
out, the ratio of leading technologies in the two sectors equals µ1/2 in odd
periods and 1
µ1/2
in even ones; that is, the lead of the patent race alternates
between sectors ad infinitum.
I analyze two perfect-foresight equilibria: an acyclical, immediate im-
plementation equilibrium and a cyclical, synchronized implementation one. In
the former, capital makers implement a patent as soon as they receive it. In the
latter, the capital maker receiving a patent first (henceforth, “firm 1”) waits
and implements it together with the capital maker receiving a patent second
(henceforth, “firm 2”) ; that is patents are implemented in even periods.19
For each equilibrium, I first ensure that requirements (1) - (2) in Defini-
tion 2 are satisfied. Next, I specify the conditions under which the conjectured
timing of the patents’ implementation is optimal for the capital-good firms (re-
quirement (3) in Definition 2) . Last, I confirm that the no-storage condition
is met and pin down the transversality condition.
19Although I have not explored this possibility explicitly, I find no reason for why there
cannot be a symmetric equilibrium in which patents are implemented in odd periods, which,
in fact, could well be the case under the premise that period 1 summarizes the state of an
economy starting in −∞ . This would require simply letting τ denote an odd period. Since
time however starts in an odd period, welfare in the two cyclical equilibria will be different.
See my conjecture on that in fn. 42 .
118
3.3.1 Immediate implementation equilibrium
In the immediate (acyclical) implementation equilibrium, firms expect each
other to implement their patents immediately.
Period τ − 1 . Firm 1 receives a patent which it immediately implements.
Since I assume throughout that condition (3.17) holds, firm 1 sets the same
price as its competitors would, given by (3.14) , and produce the quantity
which the technology level of their competitors justifies, given by (3.15) . In
line with the analysis above, the technology levels in the two sectors are










(1− lτ ) (3.24)
kτ,2 =
(




(1− lτ ) . (3.25)





























20Whenever I omit j or − j from the technology subscript, I refer to all firms within a
sector.
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Observe that investment depends negatively on the interest rate paid in the
following period, whereas it is proportionally related to the following period’s
employment, an implication of the constant-returns-to-scale technology of the
final good.
















(1− lτ−1) . (3.29)




















Output depends negatively on the interest rate paid currently: the higher the
current interest rate the lower the investment in capital and, thus, the lower
current production is.





































Period τ . Firm 2 receives and immediately implements a patent. In period
τ , technology in the two sectors is ψτ,1, = µψ and ψτ,2,−j = µ
1


















(1− lτ+1) . (3.33)


























































































Period τ + 1 . Firm 1 receives and implements a patent. Technology in the
two sectors is ψτ+1,1,−j = µψ < ψτ+1,1,j = µ2 ψ and ψτ+1,2 = µ
3














(1− lτ+2) . (3.37)

































































































The above satisfy optimality and market clearing, that is requirements
(1) - (2) of the equilibrium definition. Next, I exploit stationarity and check
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for consistency and no storage in turn.
For accordingly formed expectations, an immediate implementation (acycli-
cal) equilibrium is sustained as long as each firm which receives a patent finds it
optimal to implement it immediately. I split this into two steps, as in Shleifer
(1986) , which I label “Profit Condition 1 (IPC1)” and “Profit Condition 2
(IPC2) .”
Profit condition 1 . In the acyclical equilibrium the economy grows at a
constant rate. By symmetry, employment and the real interest rate remain
constant across periods, that is lτ = lτ+1 ≡ l and Rτ−1 = Rτ ≡ R (see also
fn. 21) .
A firm prefers to implement a patent immediately rather than in the
following period if and only if condition (3.19) is satisfied. Given that em-
ployment and the real interest rate are constant, condition (3.19) simplifies
to
R ≥ 1 . (IPC1)
Profit condition 2 . I look for the condition under which no firm receiving
a patent has an incentive to wait for two periods irrespectively of the fact that
a new patent will arrive in its sector rendering the one in question obsolete.
That is interest rates must be such that no firm has an incentive to wait “too








Since Rt−1 = Rt ≡ R , the above condition boils down once again to
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R ≥ 1 . (IPC2)
Profit condition 2 ensures that firm 1 does not postpone implementation to
the next odd period and firm 2 to the next even one.
Combining profit conditions (IPC1) and (IPC2) implies that no firm
postpones implementation to any period after the next odd (for firm 1) or
even (for firm 2) one either. To see this, note that profit condition (IPC2)
implies that, for instance, firm 1 does not wait until the next odd period,
whereas by profit condition (IPC1) , it does not wait until the even period
following this, and so forth, and likewise for firm 2 .
Balanced growth path
As I have already noted, by symmetry, lodd = leven ≡ l and Rτ−1 = Rτ ≡
R .21 Then, it follows from (3.23) that v = λ
1
2 and from (3.22) , (3.31) and
(3.38) together that λ = µ
1
α
−1 . Then, by (3.23) , the real interest rate along






. Since µ > 1 , α ∈ (0 , 1) and
β ∈ (0 , 1) , it follows that R > 1 , which satisfies profit conditions (IPC1)
and (IPC2) as well as the no-storage condition (Condition 1) .22
These lead to the following corollary:
Corollary 1 (Steady growth). An acyclical (steady-growth) equilibrium is al-
ways possible for accordingly formed expectations.
Further, the endogenous variables evolve as follows on the balanced
21One can confirm that this is in fact a unique stationary solution by taking the same
steps as in the synchronized implementation equilibrium. The steps in the case of the
synchronized implementation equilibrium are collected in the Appendix.
22 Since R > 1 , the transversality condition, which I show for the synchronized imple-



























µ − β(1− α) + (1− β(1− α))µ1+ 12 ( 1α−1) + 1
]−1
. (3.40)
That is, in the acyclical (baseline) equilibrium, output, consumption, and
investment grow at the same constant rate, whereas employment remains con-
stant across time.
A higher innovation rate, µ , sets the economy onto a steeper growth
path and results in a higher real interest rate, while a lower subjective discount
factor β also calls for a higher interest rate. Turning to leisure, it increases in
µ and the relative taste parameter for leisure χ and decreases in β .
3.3.2 Synchronized implementation equilibrium
I focus on the synchronized (cyclical) implementation equilibrium at which,
firm 1, which receives a patent in an odd period, finds it optimal to save it and
implement it in the following even period together with firm 2 which receives
a patent then (see also fn. 19) .
Period τ−1 . A patent reaches firm 1 and is not implemented but is instead
stored and implemented in τ . Effectively, from the viewpoint of τ − 1 , a not
implemented patent is as if it had never arrived. As (3.17) holds, firm 1
(likewise, firm 2) sets the same price and produces the same quantity as its
23To find leisure, I use the intratemporal optimality condition χ xtlt = wt , where, from




competitors would, given by (3.14) and (3.15) , respectively, and it produces
at the same marginal cost as they would. The technology with which the
following period’s capital is produced is ψτ−1,1,−j = ψ and ψτ−1,2 = µ
1
2 ψ .







(1− lτ ) (3.41)
kτ,2 =
(


































Likewise, as the technology of firm j’s competitors in τ − 2 is given by
ψt−2,1,−j = µ−1 ψ and ψt−2,2,−j = µ−
1







































Market clearing in the final-good market implies that consumption in































Period τ . Implementation takes place in both sectors. Technology across
capital makers in the two sectors is ψτ,1,−j = ψ < ψτ,1,j = µψ and ψτ,2,−j =
µ
1
2 ψ < ψτ,2,j = µ
3






























































































Period τ+1 . A patent reaches firm 1 but it is kept stored until period τ+2 ,
when the next implementation boom takes place. Since it is not implemented,
effectively it is as if it had never arrived. Effective technology in the two sectors
is ψτ+1,1,−j = µψ and ψτ+1,2 = µ
3




































































































A two-period implementation cycle -of the type that I focus on- requires
firm 1 , which receives a patent in an odd period to find it optimal to wait ex-
actly one period before implementing it, and firm 2, which receives a patent
in the following even period to find it optimal to implement it immediately. I
will take the same steps as in the case of the acyclical equilibrium. Starting
with consistency and taking stationarity into account, I first derive the condi-
tion under which firm 1 prefers to postpone implementation to the following
period rather than implement immediately, which I label “Profit Condition 1
(SPC1) ;” subsequently, I explore the condition under which firm 1 prefers not
to postpone implementation from the following implementation boom to the
one after that, which I label “Profit Condition 2 (SPC2) .” The two conditions
combined imply that firm 1 prefers to wait exactly one period to implement
and firm 2 prefers to implement immediately than in any future period. Omit-
ted derivations in what follows are collected in the Appendix.
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Profit condition 1 . Firm 1 prefers to implement in the following period
rather than immediately as long as its present discounted profits in the former
case exceed its present discounted profits in the latter (recall profits are realized
one period after implementation) .24 Given stationarity and τ being an even




















which as I show in the Appendix boils down to
µ [1 + β (1− α)]




We can see that (3.58) is more easily satisfied as µ and β increase and as
α decreases. A higher innovation rate implies higher profits, hence a greater
incentive for firms to coordinate in the presence of demand externalities. A
higher β implies that firm 1 is more likely to wait for a certain level of profits;
in the limit as β → 1 , (3.58) is always satisfied. Turning to α , it parametrizes
both the capital share (1−α) as well as the elasticity of substitution between
the two types of capital ( 1
α
) . Greater values of the former and lower of the
latter imply that implementation cycles are more easily sustained. As α falls,
both increase. However, the former effect dominates, hence (3.58) is more
24Of course, expectations are centered around the synchronized implementation equilib-
rium in both cases. On the lack of strategic interactions among firms see fn. 11 .
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easily met. Last, observe that (3.58) is independent of the relative weight of
leisure χ in the agent’s preferences which is due to the separability of leisure
and consumption within the flow utility and, given this, to preferences being
logarithmic in consumption.25
Profit condition 2 . For a synchronized implementation (cyclical) equilib-
rium to be sustained, no firm must find it optimal to postpone implementation
past the two-period cycle. For this to be the case, it suffices to show that no
firm has an incentive to wait until the next implementation period, i.e. period
τ + 2 , an argument also appearing in Shleifer (1986) .
To see this in the case of firm 1 , note that, given the stationary struc-
ture of the economy, if firm 1 prefers to implement in τ rather than in τ − 1 ,
i.e. when condition (SPC1) holds, then it also finds it optimal to postpone
implementation from τ + 1 to τ + 2 . In other words, condition (SPC1) effec-
tively implies that implementation can only take place in even periods. Thus,
showing that firm 1 opts to implement in τ as opposed to doing so in τ + 2
or, by the same token, any future even period, is what I need to complete the
consistency requirement of Definition 2 . Note that this argument is indepen-
dent of the fact that a new patent will reach sector 1 in τ + 1 rendering the
patent received in τ − 1 obsolete. An analogous reasoning applies to firm 2 .








25For α = 2/3 , which by (3.17) requires µ ≤ 3 , χ = 1.5 and β = 0.97 , (3.58) requires
approximately that µ > 1.14 .
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Given that Rτ−1 = Rτ+1 and Rτ = Rτ+2 , condition (SPC2) simplifies to
Rτ Rτ+1 ≥ 1 . (3.59)
Condition (SPC2) implies that profits are discounted at an on average pos-
itive net real interest rate and we can think of it as a weak version of the
transversality condition which I analyze below.
One can confirm that conditions (3.57) and (3.59) combined imply that
firm 2 finds it optimal to implement immediately.26




−1 > 1 , since µ > 1 . (3.60)
Lemma 1. Remark 1 and (3.60) imply that (3.59) always holds.
Balanced growth path
Leisure. On the balanced growth path of the synchronized implementation
equilibrium, leisure takes values which alternate between odd and even periods
and remain constant every other period, that is lτ−1 = lτ+1 = lodd and
26 Starting with profit condition 2, it would be like (SPC2) but without Rτ−1 in the
denominators, which plays no role anyway. Then, (3.59) is what we need.








After substituting for profits, given by (3.18) , and exploiting stationarity, which implies









This holds if conditions (3.57) and (3.59) hold together which we can confirm by multiplying
the LHS of (3.57) by Rτ Rτ+1 .
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lτ = lτ+2 = leven .





µ (1 + β (1− α))







µ + β (1− α)
µ − β2(1− α)2 + 1
]−1
. (3.62)
Remark 2. It is lodd < leven .
Remark 2 implies that employment falls when implementation takes
place.
Interest rates. Equilibrium interest rates are given by (3.23) , with λ given






−1)2 α (µ + β (1− α)) + χ (µ− β2 (1− α)2)










Proof. See the Appendix.






which is the one that prevails every period in the immediate implementa-
tion (steady-growth) equilibrium. Controlling for deviations from it and using
Claim 1 implies that consumption booms when implementation takes place.
27I use interchangeably throughout lτ−1 , lτ+1 and lodd for leisure in odd periods and lτ ,
lτ+2 and leven for leisure in the even ones.
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Letting Reven and Rodd denote the real interest rate paid in odd and even
periods in the synchronized equilibrium, respectively,28 and, with R denoting
the real interest rate in the immediate implementation equilibrium, Claim 1
leads to the following remark:
Remark 3. It is Reven < R < Rodd .
Controlling for variations in employment, Remark 3 bears witness to the
presence of demand externalities between the two capital-good sectors: since
Reven < R , profits (both discounted and current-valued) of the following
firm (firm 2) , which implements a patent immediately in both equilibria, are
greater in the synchronized than in the immediate implementation one (see
also (3.18)) . Allowing for variations in employment does not overturn this
observation for all the parametrizations that I have considered.
Transversality condition. In what is the last step, I check the transver-
sality condition. The transversality condition requires the present discounted
value of the agent’s lifetime wealth to converge. In other words, the present
discounted value of the labor income and the capital-good firms’ profits needs
to converge. In the Appendix I show that the transversality condition is always
satisfied.29
With (SPC2) and the transversality condition always satisfied, the fol-
lowing proposition can be generated:
28Throughout I use interchangeably Reven , Rτ and Rτ+2 for the interest rate paid in odd
periods and Rodd , Rτ−1 and Rτ+1 for the interest rate paid in the even ones.
29This result is due to preferences being logarithmic in consumption. For general CRRA
preferences, the transversality condition is more easily satisfied the lower the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution is.
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Proposition 1. A two-period synchronized implementation equilibrium pre-
vails as a perfect-foresight equilibrium as long as condition (SPC1) and the
no-storage condition (1) are satisfied.
This proposition is central to the essay. In sharp contrast with the con-
jecture in (Shleifer, 1986, page 1183) , implementation cycles with capital can
be generated and they do so for plausible values of the parameters. Impor-
tantly, this happens in the presence of storable commodities and in the absence
of borrowing constraints and investment irreversibilities (on the latter see also
fn. 33 ). But how so? Following Shleifer’s line of thought, one would expect
that, in the prospect of future profits, agents would reduce current savings
and, thereby, future capital stock in order to smooth out their consumption
across periods. At the same time, a (real) interest rate increase would be
necessary to prevent agents from borrowing in the period before the wealth
expansion. Both effects combined imply that firms’ present discounted profits
in an implementation boom would fall which could eventually eliminate their
incentives to postpone implementation until then.
This intuition does not apply here. This is because, in sharp contrast
with Shleifer (1986) in which innovations are sector-neutral, that is they en-
hance total factor productivity (TFP), innovations here are investment-specific
as in Greenwood et al. (1997, 2000) . This difference in modeling technological
change is important. Unlike changes in TFP, investment-specific technological
change introduces a one-period discrepancy between the date firms invest and
the date they receive their revenue. As a result, a coordinated implementa-
tion of patents implies a concurrent considerable fall in savings/investment -in
fact, investment can even undershoot- due to the reduced cost of producing
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capital and a considerable increase in the wealth of agents in the period fol-
lowing it.30 The former implies that consumption grows considerably in an
implementation boom even after taking into account the effects on output.31
The latter implies that the consumption boom takes place before the wealth
boom. This not only eliminates the need to smooth consumption away from
the wealth boom to the period before it, but, additionally, it implies that the
interest rate linking the implementation period to the one when revenue is
realized and wealth expands actually falls (Remark 3) . As a result, firms dis-
count future profits less rather than more. The fall in the real interest rate,
in turn, causes two, tied to each other, effects. First, it increases investment
in an implementation period which thereby smooths out consumption in the
opposite direction from the conjectured one, though (without overturning re-
sults; Claim 1 is a general equilibrium result) . Second, it leads to an increase
of the capital stock in the period revenue is realized relative to that in the im-
plementation period.32 With the demand for capital being elastic, this implies
that the profits capital-good firms make following an implementation boom
grow rather than fall (see also (3.18)) relative to the profits they would have
made had they implemented alone. Taking everything into account, present
discounted profits increase which eventually makes implementation cycles pos-
sible (Proposition 1) .33
30In fact, output and, consequently, labor income also boosts with a one-period lag (see
the analysis below) . This need not be always true. For instance, in the extreme case in
which labor is inelastically supplied, labor income booms when implementation takes place.
Nevertheless, for all the parametrizations that I have considered, variations in labor income
prove insufficient to make the wealth boom happen simultaneously with the consumption
boom and, hence, potentially overturn the intuition in the main text.
31More precisely, consumption grows above trend as Claim 1 attests.
32Simply compare equations (3.41) - (3.42) with (3.49) - (3.50) . The result follows from
Remarks 2 and 3 .
33As I noted in fn. 10 , that capital depreciates fully effectively rules out disinvestment
and, therefore, it could be argued that I impose investment irreversibilities which according
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Below I discuss the role of parameters in the generation of cycles and
the balanced growth path. I set α = 2
3
, which by (3.17) implies that µ ≤ 3
and, based on Greenwood et al. (2000) , χ = 1.5 and consider values of β
close to 1 .34 A consequence of setting α = 2
3
is that v , given by (3.63) , is
greater than one. In turn, this implies that Rτ is greater than one, whereas by
Claim 1 , Rτ+1 is also greater than one. As a result, the no-storage condition
is always satisfied.
Generation of cycles. A greater innovation rate sets the economy onto a
steeper growth path which is accompanied with higher interest rates, Rτ and
Rτ+1 . However, Rτ+1 increases sufficiently more than the interest rate paid af-
ter an implementation boom, Rτ , does so that the RHS of (3.57) falls. In other
words, controlling for changes in employment which as I argue next actually
reinforce this effect, as the innovation rate increases, discounted profits in an
implementation boom become greater relative to profits that would be realized
if firm 1 instead opted to implement alone. This is because a greater innovation
rate results in considerably reduced savings/investment in an implementation
period. In turn, this implies a substantial increase in contemporaneous con-
sumption both in absolute and, crucially, in relative to trend terms, where I








to (Shleifer, 1986, page 1183) could render implementation cycles possible. The way I
interpret his argument, even though such an interpretation may be susceptible to criticism,
is that he expects that too volatile investment would rule implementation cycles with capital
out. By allowing for full capital depreciation, I indeed maximize the volatility of investment
as new capital needs to be produced every period. In fact, as it may have already become
apparent, it is the excessive investment volatility -actually investment can even undershoot-
that renders implementation cycles with capital possible here.
34The numerical values that I report below correspond to β = 0.97 , which is again based
on Greenwood et al. (2000) . In fact, many results below hold for a much wider range of
parametrizations, however I abstract from such considerations.
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acterizes the immediate implementation (steady-growth) equilibrium.35
Turning to leisure/employment, a greater innovation rate, µ , results in




1−lτ , which is on the LHS of (3.57) increases. Taking both
effects into account, the greater the innovation rate µ , the more attractive an
implementation boom is to firm 1 .
A greater β lowers v , that is consumption in the implementation periods
becomes higher both in absolute and relative to trend terms, and both interest
rates. This is because agents become more patient. However, Rτ+1 falls less
relative to Rτ and the RHS of (3.57) decreases. Parallel to this, a greater
discount factor β decreases leisure in all periods as well as the leisure ratio
lτ+1
lτ
, whereas it increases the employment ratio 1−lτ+1
1−lτ , which is on the LHS
of (3.57) . Once again both effects imply that a higher β leads more easily to
implementation cycles.
Next, I analyze the balanced growth path.

















Within a cycle, we know that xτ+1
xτ
= v , whereas output and invest-




α−1) , that of capital is µ
1
2α
and that of employment is 1 .
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which follow from (3.52) and (3.55) , and (3.51) and (3.54) , respectively.
After substituting for the interest rates, given by (3.23) , and using eq. (3.97)














1 + β(1− α)
)
, (3.66)
where v is given by (3.63) .
For the considered parametrization, output grows above trend in the
period following the implementation of patents. Investment is procyclical and
undershoots: it falls when implementation takes place, as fewer resources need
to be directed towards the production of capital goods, and rises sharply in
the period following implementation. Further, by Remark 2 employment is
procyclical, whereas, most notably, by Claim 1 consumption is countercyclical.
As I argued above, it is necessary for the generation of cycles that consumption
booms in the implementation periods.
The above and (3.65) and (3.66) imply that investment is more volatile




. In turn, output is more volatile than employ-
ment. Notably (for the considered parametrization), consumption is also more
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volatile than output36 but less volatile than investment. The interpretation for
this is simple: with output relatively stable, a very volatile investment implies
a very volatile consumption.
As the innovation rate increases, investment, consumption and employ-
ment become more volatile, whereas the volatility of output responds non-
monotonically increasing at low values of µ and falling at higher ones.37
3.4 Welfare
From a planner’s viewpoint, both equilibria are suboptimal which is due to the
(periodic) presence of monopolies in the capital-good markets.38 Nevertheless,
the equilibria can be Pareto ranked.
In the immediate implementation equilibrium, the lifetime utility of the











37In addition to these, note that, for the considered parametrization, capital is counter-
cyclical. To see this, recall that, because of “limit-pricing,” implementing firms produce the
quantity of capital that their competitors would produce. This implies that, controlling for
variations in interest rates and leisure, patents will affect the quantity of capital installed
after two periods. Further, capital is more volatile than output, which should not come as a
surprise given that it depreciates fully within a period, is less volatile than investment and
its volatility increases in µ .
38Since the implementation of a patent improves the technology of an implementing firm’s
competitors, one would suggest that externalities is an additional source of inefficiency. My
argument for why this is not indeed an issue is the same as the one in Shleifer (1986) (in
particular, see (Shleifer, 1986, page 1178) and fn. 10 there) . In principle, this potential
problem could be corrected by allowing for decentralized markets on a one-to-one basis
between the firm endowed with a patent and one of its competitors with the former setting
the price in exchange for sharing the rights to its patent (we can equivalently think in terms
of contracts on an individual, “take it or leave it” basis) . The presence of constant returns to
scale in the capital-good’s technology implies that competitors, which behave symmetrically,
will demand zero at any positive price since, afterwards, they will Bertrand-compete at least
with the firm owning the patent which, in turn, is not willing to suggest a zero price. Hence,
markets would clear at positive prices small enough so that demand and supply are equal
to zero in each period. Therefore, externalities is not an additional source of inefficiency.
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representative agent, given by (3.1) - (3.2) , is equal to
Ui = log x
i














−1 xi1 + χ log l
)
+ . . . ,
where I have taken into account that leisure is constant across time and that





−1) (see (3.39) - (3.40)) . This expres-








1− β log µ
1
α
−1 + log xi1 + χ log l
)
, (3.67)
where l is given by (3.40) .
In the synchronized implementation equilibrium, the lifetime utility of
the agent is

















−1 xs1 + χ log lodd
)
+. . . ,
where I have taken into account that leisure is constant controlling for the
period being odd or even and that consumption grows as (3.21) and (3.22)











log v + log xs1 +
χ
1 + β




where v is given by (3.63) and lodd , leven are given by (3.61) and (3.62) ,
respectively.
To make welfare comparisons, simply subtract (3.68) from (3.67) to get
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For the considered parametrization, welfare is greater in the immediate
implementation equilibrium than in the synchronized implementation one.39
To analyze this result, I will start with the last terms in (3.69) , which reflect
differences in welfare due to differences in leisure levels. For the considered
values of α , χ and β and sufficiently high values of µ , the leisure component
of lifetime utility is greater in the synchronized implementation equilibrium.
However, the effect of leisure in welfare comparisons is typically negligible.
What is crucial is differences in lifetime consumption. To analyze these,
I will draw a distinction between the difference in the initial consumption
levels, captured by the third and the fourth term in (3.69) combined, and
the difference in the consumption growth rates between the two equilibria,
captured by the first two terms. The latter takes a negative value by Claim
1 . To see this, recall that the growth rate every two periods is the same
across equilibria. Hence, the difference in consumption growth is due to the
difference in the growth rate within a cycle, captured by the first two terms in
(3.69) . Since consumption grows faster in the synchronized implementation
equilibrium (Claim 1) , the first two terms combined take a negative value.
Turning to the initial level of consumption, it is higher in the immediate
39In fact, I have failed to obtain the opposite result for a wide range of parametrizations.
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implementation equilibrium. To see this compare (3.31) and (3.48) .40 It turns
out that in the immediate implementation equilibrium output is greater and
investment lower compared to the synchronized implementation equilibrium.41
Controlling for the interest rates which do not overturn the result for the con-
sidered parametrization, investment is lower in the immediate implementation
equilibrium since one firm (firm 1) implements a patent as opposed to none
doing so in the synchronized implementation one (compare (3.26 with (3.43)) .
As for output, once again controlling for the interest rates, it is greater in the
immediate implementation equilibrium because patents in sector 1 are imple-
mented faster which leads to a greater level of capital of type 1 (compare (3.28)
with (3.45)) and, hence, a greater level of output.42
3.4.1 Initial levels of capital/investment
Section 3.3 analyzed the two equilibria independently of each other. By this I
mean that, in each equilibrium, the economy starts with the “right” quantity
of capital-goods.
Below, I find the initial (period-0) investment required in each equilib-
rium. I suppose that the level of initial investment is the one that would have
prevailed if time had started in −∞ . Therefore, I set ψ = 1 and divide the
40Since what matters is relative consumption, any odd-period consumption would do for
the comparison between equilibria.
41The result for investment is true for the standard parametrization but not in all the
ones that I have considered, whereas the results for output and, crucially, consumption hold
for all the parametrizations that I have considered.
42I have not explored welfare in the case of a synchronized implementation equilibrium
in which implementation booms take place in odd periods (see also fn. 19) . Nevertheless,
since that cyclical equilibrium is symmetric with the one considered here and given that
time here commences in an odd period, my conjecture is that results would possibly be
overturned. Such an argument could apply to the welfare considerations in Section 3.5 as
well.
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RHS of both (3.34) and (3.51) by µ
1
α




































, lτ+1 is given by (3.61) and Rτ =
v
β
with v given by (3.63) .
For the considered parametrization,44 initial investment is greater in
the immediate implementation equilibrium. As a result, the two cases can be
Pareto ranked only conditional on this difference in initial investment.
3.5 The Desirability of Extending Patent Rights
In this section I explore whether extending the patent horizon is potentially
welfare-improving. Therefore, the only assumption that I relax concerns the
duration of patent rights. In particular, I let firms make monopoly profits out
of a patent for two periods instead of one. Everything else remains unchanged.
43I opted for initial investment rather than initial levels of capital in order to facilitate
comparisons between equilibria. To find initial levels of capital one needs to set ψ = 1 in
kτ−1,1 and kτ−1,2 .
44In particular, this is true for all the parametrizations that I have considered.
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3.5.1 Immediate implementation equilibrium
As in Section 3.3.1 , leisure and the real interest rate remain constant across
periods with values given by l˜ and R , respectively, which I find subsequently.45
Period τ − 1 . Firm 1 receives a patent which it immediately implements,
whereas firm 2 , which implemented its patent in the previous period, enters its
second and last period as a monopolist. The technology levels in the two sec-
tors are ψτ−1,1,−j = ψ < ψτ−1,1,j = µψ and ψτ−1,2,−j = µ−
1
2 ψ < ψτ−1,2,j =
µ
1














(1− l˜) . (3.73)




























Similarly, since ψτ−2,1,−j = µ− 1 ψ and ψτ−2,2,−j = µ−
1
2 ψ ,
45As it will become evident below, the real interest rate in an immediate implementation
(steady-growth) equilibrium is the same irrespectively of the duration of patent rights, hence































































Period τ . Firm 2 receives and immediately implements a patent. In period
τ , technology in sector 1 remains as in τ − 1 , that is ψτ,1,−j = ψ < ψτ,1,j =
µψ , whereas in sector 2 it becomes ψτ,2,−j = µ
1
2 ψ < ψτ,2,j = µ
3
2 ψ . Capital














(1− l˜) . (3.79)
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Period τ + 1 . Firm 1 receives and implements a patent. Technology in the






























































































As each firm can make profits for two periods out of a patent, profit condition












The LHS refers to discounted profits as of t− 1 made when a patent is imme-
diately implemented, whereas the RHS refers to discounted profits made when
a patent is implemented in the following period. The above condition does
not take into account that, in the latter case, after one period a new patent
will render the one in question obsolete, which would imply that the condition
would be more easily satisfied.
148












Since in the steady-growth equilibrium, employment and interest rates
are constant, so are temporal profits. Then, both profit conditions boil down
to R ≥ 1 .46
Balanced growth path












, which implies that




χ (µ − β(1− α)) + 1
]−1
. (3.82)
3.5.2 Synchronized implementation equilibrium
In the synchronized implementation equilibrium (of the type I considered in
Section 3.3) , firm 1 postpones implementation until the following even period
when it implements together with firm 2 . Let me start with the profit con-
ditions and, subsequently, show a synchronized implementation equilibrium is
not possible when rights over a patent last two periods.
For firm 1 which receives a patent, say, in τ − 1 to prefer to implement
in period τ rather than immediately, it must be that























By juxtaposing (3.84) with (SPC1) , we can see that postponing imple-
mentation to the following period when the monopoly horizon is two periods
is equivalent to postponing implementation to two periods afterwards in the
context of the synchronized equilibrium in the one-period monopoly case.
Since in a stationary equilibrium interest rates and employment remain
constant controlling for the period being odd or even, it follows that Πτ =
Πτ+2 . This implies that (3.84) becomes
Rτ Rτ+1 < 1 . (3.85)























Given that it is not possible that firms make negative profits in equilibrium
47As it has been so far in this essay, whenever it comes to profit condition 2 , I ignore the
possibility that new patents can render the ones in question obsolete, which would imply
that profit condition 2 is more easily met.
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since in that case they would rather not implement their patents, this expres-
sion becomes (recall that, by stationarity, Rτ = Rτ+2)
Rτ Rτ+1 ≥ 1 . (3.87)
Juxtaposing (3.85) and (3.87) implies that synchronized implementation
is not possible when patent rights last two periods.
Below I explore whether extending patent rights to two periods can lead
to a welfare improvement.
3.5.3 Welfare
I showed above that only the immediate implementation equilibrium is possible








1− β log µ
1
α
−1 + log x˜i1 + χ log l˜
)
, (3.88)
where l˜ is given by (3.82) . I will compare (3.88) with the lifetime utility in
the two equilibria which can prevail when firms profit out of a patent once.
That is I will compare (3.88) with (3.68) and (3.67) in that order.
Welfare comparison with the synchronized implementation equilib-
rium
The difference in lifetime utilities is given by
48To be precise, I have failed to find an equilibrium besides this one.
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I will take the same steps as in Section 3.4 . Starting with the leisure
terms, one can confirm that l˜ > leven > lodd . The first inequality follows
by comparing (3.82) with (3.62) , whereas the second follows from Remark 2 .
Then, although its role is non-pivotal in welfare comparisons, leisure utility is
greater in the two-period-patent equilibrium.
Turning to consumption, by Claim 1 and as explained in Section 3.4
the growth terms together take a negative value. However, what is once again
crucial for the welfare comparison outcome is the distance between the initial
levels of consumption in the two equilibria given by (3.48) and (3.77) . It
turns out that for sufficiently low values of the innovation rate, µ , initial
consumption is greater in the two-period-patent equilibrium (see also Figure
3.1) . To show this, I will proceed into two steps.
Starting with initial output levels, we can see from (3.47) and (3.76) for
ψ = 1 that




























Taking into account that l˜ > lodd and that, by Remark 3 , Reven < R implies
that the last term is positive, hence initial output is greater in the synchronized
implementation, one-period-patent equilibrium than in the two-period-patent
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one. Furthermore, for the considered parametrization, the initial output dif-
ference increases in µ .
Turning to initial investment levels, we can see from (3.44) and (3.75)
for ψ = 1 that






























For the considered parametrization, the last term is positive and the initial
(positive) investment difference grows in µ .49
It follows from the above that both initial output and investment are
greater in the synchronized implementation (one-period-patent) equilibrium
relative to the two-period-patent one. To inspect things a bit more, control
for the differences in interest rates and employment, and observe that output
is the same in the two equilibria, whereas investment in greater in the synchro-
nized implementation one. The former is due to firms using the same level of
capital in odd periods -again, controlling for interest rates and employment;
to see this, observe that, in even periods, the implementing firms competitors’
technology level is the same in both equilibria. In turn, this, of course, means
that initial output differences are entirely attributed to differences in inter-
est rates (general equilibrium effects) and employment rather than directly to
technology/implementation reasons. It is the presence of volatility then that
favors initial output in the synchronized implementation one-period-patent
equilibrium.
Initial investment differences can be accounted for by cyclical as well
49In fact, the initial output and investment differences are positive for all the parametriza-
tions that I have considered.
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as -importantly- by technology/implementation differences directly. Starting
with the latter, observe that, first, patents in sector 2 diffuse to the economy
faster in the synchronized implementation one-period-patent equilibrium; sec-
ond, patents in sector 1 are implemented earlier in the two-period immedi-
ate implementation equilibrium. Both remarks point to lower investment in
the two-period-patent equilibrium. To see the first remark, simply juxtapose
(3.42) and (3.73) and observe that -again after controlling for interest rates
and leisure- more type-2 capital needs to be installed in the synchronized im-
plementation one-period-patent equilibrium. The reason is that, even though
sector-2 patents are implemented simultaneously in the two equilibria, firms
appropriate them for one additional period in the two-period one. As a re-
sult, they become available to their competitors with a one-period delay. To
see the second remark, simply recall that sector-1 patents are implemented
immediately in the two-period-patent equilibrium, whereas they do so with
a one-period delay in the synchronized implementation one-period-patent one
(confirm this by juxtaposing (3.43) and (3.74)) . Turning to interest rate and
employment differences (cyclical/general equilibrium effects) , they push in
the opposite direction ,50 however without overturning the implications of the
technology/implementation ones.
Is there a dominant effect? Not for the considered parametrization. At
sufficiently low values of µ the “investment” effect dominates the “output”
effect (∆y < ∆i) , hence initial consumption is greater in the two-period-
patent equilibrium. However, ∆y /∆i increases in µ and becomes greater
50That is, controlling for technology differences, investment is lower in the synchronized













is negative. Furthermore, it decreases in
µ .
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than one for high enough values of it. The threshold value is µ∗ ' 2.14 .
Since the role of initial consumption level is pivotal in welfare com-
parisons, they, in turn, will exhibit a nearly identical pattern: for sufficiently
low values of µ , the two-period-patent equilibrium is Pareto-superior to the
synchronized implementation one-period-patent equilibrium.51 The threshold
value in the welfare comparison is µ∗∗ ' 1.95 (see also Figure 3.1) , which
is lower than µ∗ since the combination of the growth and the leisure effects
favors the synchronized implementation equilibrium.
Welfare comparison with the immediate implementation equilibrium
The difference in lifetime utilities is given by
Ui − U˜i = 1
1− β
[
log xi1 − log x˜i1 + χ (log l − log l˜)
]
. (3.92)
Starting with the leisure terms, we can confirm by comparing (3.40)
and (3.82) that l˜ > l . However, the effect of leisure in the welfare comparison
is negligible.
Turning to consumption, I show in the Appendix that, for all parameter
values, xi1 > x˜
i
1 . Noting that the sequence of interest rates is the same in
the two equilibria, technology/implementation related reasons underlie this
result. More precisely, patents might be (first) implemented at the same time
in the two equilibria, however, in the two-period-patent equilibrium, firms
can profit out of these for one additional period. This implies that -in the
two-period-patent equilibrium- patents become available to the implementing
firms’ competitors and, hence, to the whole economy with a one-period delay.
51Of course, one needs to make sure first that condition (SPC1) is met so that a synchro-
nized implementation equilibrium is possible.
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As a result, the economy reaches a certain consumption level slower.
To see this, control for differences in employment and confirm that, in
each period t, one type of capital, with the type alternating between odd and
even periods, is greater by µ
1
α in the one-period-patent equilibrium. On the
one hand, this of course implies that output is greater in the one-period-patent






at all t .52 On the other hand, the one-period delay with which patents diffuse
in the two-period-patent equilibrium results in lower investment. This is be-
cause less capital of some type needs to be installed in the following period.
Once again controlling for differences in employment, we can see (for instance,





−1) i˜t , for all t . That is extending
patent rights to two periods implies that investment falls proportionally more
relative to output. Nevertheless, these are in relative terms; in absolute terms
the “output” effect always dominates the “investment” effect and consumption
falls. Furthermore, the initial consumption difference grows in µ .53
With initial consumption’s role being pivotal in the welfare compar-
ison, welfare is greater in the one-period-patent immediate implementation
equilibrium.
Combining the results above leads to the central policy conclusion of
the essay:
Proposition 2. For a sufficiently low innovation rate, extending the length of
patent rights to two periods can lead to a welfare improvement.





1− l > 1− l˜ .
53 This result holds for all the parametrizations that I have considered.
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Initial level of investment
Proceeding as in Section 3.4.1 , to find the initial level of investment in the





















For all considered parametrizations, initial investment in the two-period-patent
equilibrium is lower than in both one-period-patent equilibria. Hence, the wel-
fare improvement that Proposition 2 considers is unconditional on the initial
level of investment.
3.6 Conclusion
This essay showed that implementation cycles in the presence of capital and
the absence of borrowing constraints or constraints on investment volatility are
possible. The reason is that patents are on investment-specific technological
change which introduces a one-period discrepancy between the time a new
patent is implemented and the time revenue out of it is realized.
Furthermore, the exogenous generation of patents permitted it to view
patent rights from a different perspective. The “default” one concerns the
incentives of innovators which, ultimately, affect the generation of patents.
This essay abstracted from this, otherwise important and heated, debate and,
instead, focused on the effects that the length of patent rights can have on
the implementation of patents. In particular, it showed that a prolongation
of patent rights eliminates implementation cycles and may lead to a welfare
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improvement.
The model, arguably highly stylized, certainly has its limitations. From
a macro-perspective, consumption booms before output and is too volatile.
From a more theoretical one, the analysis was silent about transitional dy-
namics, whereas, what is a related issue, the initial conditions were assumed
to be the “right” ones. Resolving these issues could be part of future research.
3.7 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Condition 1 (No storage) : There are two kinds of storable
commodities in the economy: the capital goods and the final good. I deal
with these in turn. The storage technology I assume in both cases is one-to-
one.
Capital goods. Suppose that capital-good firm j produces an addi-
tional unit of capital good i in period t − 1 and, instead of selling it to the
final-good firm in period t , it instead stores and sells it in period t + 1 (I
assume that capital depreciates only if used) . The cost of producing it as of
t− 1 is, say, 1
ψ
, whereas the revenue generated out of it as of t− 1 is qt+1
RtRt−1
,
where q is the competitive price offered by the final-good firm given by (3.14) .







which is equivalent to
Rt−1 > 1 . (3.94)
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If, instead, the capital-good firm considers selling the additional unit
of capital in period t + 2 , then, ignoring the possibility that a new idea will
render the one in question obsolete, the no-storage condition becomes
RtRt−1 < 1 .
It follows then that (3.94) suffices to rule out storage in this case as well. Of
course, if a new patent renders the one in question obsolete and supposing that
the firm in question receives the new patent (see also the last paragraph in
this proof), discounted revenue will be even lower and the no-storage condition
will hold even more easily.
Proceeding in this way, (3.94) suffices to rule out storage and sale of a
capital good in any period after period t+ 2 . Therefore, positive net interest
rates rule out storage in equilibrium.
Let me underline that, in the above argument, I have implicitly assumed
that a capital-good firm sells at least an infinitesimally small quantity of the
capital good it specializes in in t . This implies that in case it possesses and
makes use of a superior technology (patent) , that becomes publicly available in
t so that its competitors copy it and the competitive price prevails in t+1 . And,
of course, I rule out the possibility that a firm uses two different technologies
at the same time.
I deal with the possibility that a capital-good firm possesses a superior
technology and does not implement it in later sections of the main text and I
label the respective conditions profit conditions 1 and 2 . In other words, the
profit conditions and the no-storage condition act in a somewhat complemen-
tary way. The former specify that a capital-good firm implements a patent
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and, since it maximizes profits, meets the whole demand for the type of capital
it specializes in when it is conjectured to do so, whereas the latter rules out
the possibility that it produces an additional amount of capital which it stores
in order to sell it in a future period.
But still there is the possibility that a firm with a superior technology
prefers to implement it in the following period, but considers using it immedi-
ately in secrecy aiming to sell the capital it produces using it in two periods.
Given that it faces a given demand from the final-good firm and acts as a profit
maximizer -that is it sells a certain profit-maximizing quantity- , for positive
net real interest rates the discounted cost of producing it tomorrow is lower
than today. Given that the price per unit is constant and common under both
scenarios, once again positive net real interest rates rule this possibility out.
As for the case in which that firm considers selling capital in any other future
period (from the third period following the considered one onwards) , see my
analysis above.
Last, note that in some of the above arguments I assumed that the
capital-good firm deciding whether to store capital or not will with certainty
have the chance to produce capital in the future which, of course, need not be
the case and which would render some of my above arguments irrelevant.
Final good. It is easy to confirm that condition (3.94) rules out stor-
age of the final good as well.
Derivations in Section 3.3.2 :
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Profit condition (3.58) . Combining (3.53) and (3.56) and given
that by stationarity xτ+1
xτ








































































The profit condition (3.57) requires that
1− lτ+1








Substituting in the LHS of (3.57) the RHS of (3.97) , taking into account
that Rτ and Rτ+1 are both positive (since λ and v , given by (3.60) and (3.63) ,
respectively, are positive) and rearranging yields the profit condition (3.58) .
Leisure equations (3.61) and (3.62) . Combining (3.6) with (3.9)



















































= wτ , (3.102)
where xτ is given by (3.53) .
Labor demand from the final-good firm (see (3.9)) is wτ =
αyτ
1−lτ , with











































χ (1− α) . (3.104)
Using (3.101) to substitute for 1−lτ+1
lτ+1
in (3.104) results in (3.62). In turn,
inserting (3.62) into (3.101) yields (3.61) .
Derivation of (3.63) . Substituting for the interest rates given by


























Inserting (3.106) into (3.105) results in (3.63) .
Proof of Claim 1 : As the fraction term in (3.63) is lower than one, it











It is straightforward to confirm that this is true.
Transversality Condition : The transversality condition (TVC) requires
the agent’s present discounted lifetime wealth to converge. I explore it for the
synchronized implementation equilibrium.
The first step is to find the present discounted lifetime wealth of the
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agent. The agent’s wealth consists of his labor income (DLI) and profits (DΠ)
out of the ownership of capital-good firms. I check both in turn.
The present discounted lifetime labor income is






+ . . . .




by stationarity, n1 = n3 = . . . , n2 = n4 = . . . , R1 = R3 = . . . and





























Since output grows by µ
1
α
−1 every two periods, the above expression boils
down to














+ . . .
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+ . . .
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, the above expressions converge, hence, the TVC
is always satisfied.
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Proceeding in the same way, it is straightforward to check that the TVC
is also always satisfied in the case of the immediate implementation equilibrium







Proof in Section 3.5.3 : Subtracting (3.77) from (3.31) -having set ψ = 1
in both- and taking into account that 1− l > 1− l˜ implies that


















−1) − µ− 12 ( 1α+1)
])




1 − µ− ( 1α−1)
]
− (1− α)µ 12 ( 1α−1)
(
1 − µ− 1α
))
> (1− α) 1α−1R− 1α (1− l˜)µ 12 ( 1α−1)
[
1 − µ− ( 1α−1) − (1− α)
(
1 − µ− 1α
)]
= (1− α) 1α−1R− 1α (1− l˜)µ 12 ( 1α−1)
[
α − µ− ( 1α−1) + (1− α)µ− 1α
]
.
In the third line, I use the fact that β ∈ (0, 1) taking into account that µ > 1
and α ∈ (0, 1) , which imply that 1 − µ−( 1α−1) > 0 .
The next step is to show that




α + 1− α ≥ µ . (3.107)
With µ > 1 and α ∈ (0, 1) , one can confirm that eq. (3.107) is always true.
Hence, xi1 > x˜
i
1 , as desired.
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Figure 3.1: Welfare comparison between the synchronized implementation
equilibrium and the two-period patent equilibrium
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